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PLEDGE YOUR BODY FOR YOUR BREAD: WELFARE, DRUG
TESTING, AND THE INFERIOR FOURTH AMENDMENT

Jordan C. Budd*

ABSTRACT

Proposals to subject welfare recipients to periodic drug testing have emerged over
the last three years as a significant legislative trend across the United States. Since
2007, over half of the states have considered bills requiring aid recipients to submit to
invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition ofpublic assistance. The vast
majority of the legislation imposes testing without regard to suspected drug use, reflecting the implicit assumption that the poor are inherently predisposed to culpable
conduct and thus may be subject to class-based intrusions that would be inarguably
impermissible if inflicted on the less destitute. These proposals are gaining increasingly substantial political support, suggesting that the enactment ofdrug testing legislation is now a real and immediate prospect.
Given the gravity of the suspicionless searches at issue, the proposals raise serious
concerns under conventional Fourth Amendment doctrine. Nevertheless, there is considerable doubt whether the federal courts will accede to that authority and prohibit
the proposed intrusions, given the long tradition of relegating the privacy rights of
the poor to inferior and indifferent enforcement. This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context within which they arise, and makes
the case for using the impending battle over suspicionless drug testing to reclaim for
the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.
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We are sending the absolutely wrong signal to the next generation
about what is needed to get ahead in life if we don't threaten benefits
for recipients who won't even lift a finger to help themselves or their
children.... I am hearing from people who accept random drug
testing as a condition for their jobs. They see no problem with having
people on public assistance doing the same.'
INTRODUCTION

In 1275, an English woman named Alice Crese failed to pay Richard of Ely for
two shillings' worth of bread.' Richard brought her before the Court of St. Ives Fair,
which ordered that she "pledge her body" for the debt.? Seven centuries later, the poor
still face the prospect ofpledging their bodies for the debt ofbread. Legislatures across
the United States are considering scores of drug testing proposals that will require the
indigent to periodically submit to invasive extraction procedures as an ongoing condition of public assistance.' The majority of the proposals require no suspicion of
drug use whatsoever; they rest instead on the implicit notion that the poor are intrinsically predisposed to immoral conduct and that, once indebted, their bodies are the
domain of the state in any event.f Not surprisingly, the proposals face nearly insurmountable difficulties under conventional Fourth Amendment authority. Perhaps more
surprisingly, there is great uncertainty whether the federal courts will accede to that
' Andre Bauer, Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina, CultureofDependency Must be
Broken, TIMES AND

DEMOCRAT

(Orangeburg, S.C.), Feb. 13, 2010, availableathttp://www

.thetandd.com/news/opinion/columnists/article_6b97a743-e3f6-5747-874e-0026fe6c3674.html.
2 Stephen E. Sachs, From St. Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortionofthe Medieval
'Law Merchant,' 21 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 685, 704 n.54 (2006).
3 id.
4 See infra Part II.C.
s See infra Part II.A. 1 & II.A.2.
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authority and prohibit the proposed search practices, given a series of recent decisions
that have upheld related privacy intrusions in defiance of apparently controlling law.'
This Article explores these legislative developments and the constitutional context
within which they arise, and makes the case for using the impending battle to reclaim
for the indigent the full reach of the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.
The poor as a class live largely beyond the Constitution. Unlike the indigent in
many comparable constitutional states, impoverished Americans enjoy no positive
socioeconomic rights nor any appreciable protection against discriminatory state action.
Recent scholarship has characterized this absence of rights recognition as the "deconstitutionalization" of American poverty law 7-a description that the United States
Supreme Court itself would likely embrace.' The rhetoric of American constitutionalism, however, holds fast to the assertion that rights of general applicability in fact
apply equally and without regard to socioeconomic status. The law may be indifferent
to the poor, we are told, but it certainly bears them no ill will.' The claim is demonstrably false. In several contexts-the Fourth Amendment prominent among themAmerican law effectively if disguisedly denies the indigent the full force of generally
applicable constitutional guarantees, thus establishing a dual system ofrights enforcement that relegates the poor to subconstitutional status.'o Beyond declarations of
formal neutrality, this veiled truth lies at the core of the nation's constitutional relationship with the dispossessed: the enforced Constitution is not only blind to poverty
but frequently antagonistic to it as well." Thus the poor live not merely beyond the
Constitution but also beneath it, at once deconstitutionalized and subconstitutionalized
in relation to the law.
This Article considers the subconstitutional dimension of American poverty law
in relation to the Fourth Amendment's privacy right. Privacy intrusions that are plainly
impermissible in analogous contexts are regularly imposed on the poor and upheld by
the courts based on the improbable recharacterization of otherwise applicable doctrine
or, as likely, its disregard. The willingness of the judiciary to suspend or dilute core
6 See infra Parts I.B.2 & II.D.2.
' See, e.g., Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: DeconstitutionalizationofPoverty Law,
DualRulesofLaw, &DialogicDefault,35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629,629-36 (2008) [hereinafter
No Scrutiny].
8 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.471,487 (1970) ("[T]he intractable economic,
social, and even philosophical problems presented by public welfare assistance programs are
not the business of this Court.").
9 See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 16 (1956) (noting aspiration to "[p]rovid[e]
equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike"); cf Stephen Loffredo, Poverty,

Democracy and ConstitutionalLaw, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1277, 1358-59 (1993) ("[E]quality

of formal rights are to be scrupulously maintained ... but the immeasurably greater political
inequalities that flow from private wealth through less visible and more ad hoc processes
may not be disturbed.").
10 See, e.g., Jordan C. Budd, A FourthAmendmentfor the PoorAlone:Subconstitutional
Status andthe Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355 (2010).
" See infra Part I.B.
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constitutional protections in this respect is consistent with the longstanding conception of the poor as inherently prone to and deserving of their predicament. Imagined
as criminally predisposed and morally bereft, the indigent constitute a presumptively
culpable class and, accordingly, face status-based intrusions that would be otherwise
irreconcilable with the Fourth Amendment's emphasis on individualized suspicion. 2
This biased and bifurcated rights analysis is sufficiently well-established to merit its
recent characterization as a "poverty exception" to the Fourth Amendment. 3
The next chapter of this constitutional assault is now being written in legislatures
across the country. Over the last three years, over half of the states have considered
legislation linking the receipt of public assistance to mandatory screening for drug
use.' 4 Some of the proposals are relatively innocuous, involving written questionnaires and recommended treatment protocols for individuals whose responses suggest
the possibility of drug dependence." Most of the proposals, however, are far more
severe, often requiring that every recipient submit to the invasive extraction ofbodily
fluids and barring assistance to anyone testing positive." Recently, members of the
United States Congress have joined the cavalcade and introduced legislation requiring states that administer federal welfare funds to conduct blanket drug testing of all
program participants."

To date, only one state has implemented a suspicionless and invasive testing requirement, although several others have enacted less onerous variants." In 1999,
Michigan passed a mandatory testing law that conditioned public assistance for every
adult recipient on a clean urinalysis report. 9 The statute was challenged immediately
and struck down by a federal districtjudge, who was then reversed by a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit. 20 The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc
and produced a perfectly ambiguous resolution: the court divided equally on the
question, with six judges voting to uphold the testing requirement and six voting to
12

See infra Part I.B.3.

Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the FourthAmendment, 55 FLA. L. REV.
391 (2003); cf A CLU ChallengesInvasive Home SearchesOf Welfare Recipients in San Diego
Area, ACLU, July 24,2000, http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/aclu-challenges-inva
"

sive-home-searches-welfare-recipients-san-diego-area ("There is no poverty exception to the
Fourth Amendment .... No one should be forced to waive her constitutional rights and submit
to an unannounced, personally humiliating, and suspicionless search ofher homejust because
she is in need of public assistance.").
14 See infra Part II.C.
See
See
'" See
1 See
'

6

infra notes 287-88 and accompanying text.
infra Part II.C.I and II.C.2.
infra note 188 and accompanying text.
infra Part II.B.

' Pub. Act No. 17, 1999 Mich. Pub. Acts 49-50 (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS §
400.571 (2009)).
20 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich.2000), rev'd,309 F.3d 330
(6th Cir. 2002), reh'gen bancgranted,judgment vacated,319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), aff'd by an equally divided court, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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strike it down, thus reinstating the lower court's injunction but failing to clarify the
constitutional question in any respect. 21
Not surprisingly, the evenly divided outcome has been taken not as a repudiation
of such extraordinarily overreaching proposals but as an encouraging sign that the
federal courts may well uphold such intrusions.22 In the years since the conclusion of
the Michigan case, legislatures across the country have considered scores ofbills proposing testing requirements of equal or harsher application. 23 The proposals have
garnered ever-increasing and, recently, quite substantial support.24 It thus appears that
other states may soon follow Michigan's lead and require the federal courts to finally
resolve the permissibility of blanket drug testing as a condition of public assistance.
Based on the judiciary's approach to other seemingly impermissible intrusions upon
the privacy of the poor, as well as the divided resolution in the Michigan litigation, the
prospects of vindicating the constitutional rights of aid recipients is uncertain at best.
The Article is divided into two parts. Part One provides a brief overview of the
relationship of the poor to the United States Constitution, describing both the overt
exclusion of socioeconomic class from constitutional recognition and the veiled
subordination of the poor with respect to the enforcement of generally applicable
constitutional rights. The primary focus of the discussion is an elaboration of the
subconstitutional characteristic of poverty law in the specific context of the Fourth
Amendment's right to privacy, which sets the stage for the emerging controversy
over the blanket drug testing of welfare recipients.
Part Two turns to the prospect of invasive drug testing as a condition of public
assistance and presents the results of a national survey of related legislation over the
last three years. As the survey reveals, bills with increasingly harsh provisions are
being introduced in greater numbers each year and proceeding further through the
legislative process, suggesting that the ultimate enactment of drug testing legislation
may soon occur. Considering the absence of any data to suggest that the incidence
of drug abuse among the poor is appreciably greater than in the general population,
coupled with the harsh and disparaging rhetoric surrounding many of the current
legislative proposals, this emerging political groundswell evidently seeks to vindicate
little more than the familiar impulse to stigmatize and stereotype the impoverished.
In conclusion, Part Two contrasts the profound constitutional deficiencies of the
harshest ofthese proposals under conventional doctrine with the irreconcilable approach
of recent decisions sanctioning equally severe privacy intrusions upon the poor. When
21
22

Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).

See, e.g., Allan Greenblatt, Should Welfare Recipients Get Drug Testing?, NPR (Mar.

31, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=1 25387528 ("[The sponsor
of drug testing legislation in Kansas] thinks the constitutionality of the drug-testing regime
is itself 'definitely worth testing.' The Michigan case was decided by a tied vote, which [the
sponsor] believes is 'hardly a definite decision against states' rights."').
23 See infra Part II.C.
24 See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
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the time comes for the federal courts to finally resolve the constitutionality of suspicionless drug testing proposals, these two lines of authority will present the judiciary
with a clear and defining choice: either to reset the relationship of our nation's poor
to the promise of equal justice, or to betray again the integrity of constitutional adjudication itself.
I. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND THE CONSTITUTION
The current debate over the drug testing of welfare recipients proceeds in the
shadow of a substantial "if somewhat improvised and largely impoverished" 25 body
of constitutional authority addressing the rights of the American poor. It is a familiar
refrain that the jurisprudence accounts for class in a manner that unambiguously disfavors the indigent. 26 This general proposition in turn reflects at least three interrelated
but distinct doctrinal themes. First, as a matter of express constitutional policy, the
American poor enjoy no positive rights to socioeconomic security, irrespective of
the magnitude of the deprivation at issue.2 Second, and also as a matter of express
doctrine, the American poor receive no special solicitude when defending against discriminatory state action and thus may be subject to virtually any burden that does not
violate otherwise applicable constitutional constraints.28 Finally, with respect to the
enforcement of generally applicable constraints, American law implicitly differentiates
on the basis of class by diluting the poor's exercise of rights that purport to apply without regard to socioeconomic status.29 Taken together, these interrelated processes-the
express denial ofpositive socioeconomic rights, the express denial ofprotected status,
and the implicit dilution of generally applicable rights-render much ofthe Constitution
irrelevant at best, and hostile at worst, to the American poor. Nowhere is that theme
more powerfully evident than with respect to the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.
A. The DeclaredConstitutionand the Irrelevance of Class

In significant contrast to the basic law of most comparable nations, the United
States Constitution treats socioeconomic status as formally irrelevant in almost all
respects." This approach has been characterized as the "deconstitutionalization" of
25 Mario L. Bames & Erwin Chemerinsky, The DisparateTreatment ofRace and Class in
ConstitutionalJurisprudence,72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 110 (2009).
26 See, e.g., id.,passim;Loffredo, supranote 9, at 1305-13; Nice, No Scrutiny, supranote
7, at 629-36; James G. Wilson, ReconstructingSection Fiveofthe FourteenthAmendment to
Assist Impoverished Children, 38 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 391, 402-15 (1990).
27 See infra Part I.A.
28 Id.

29 See infra Part I.B.

See, e.g., Martha T. McCluskey, ConstitutionalizingClassInequality:Due Processin
State Farm, 56 BuFF. L.REV. 1035, 1035-36 (2008) ("[T]he Constitution treats questions ofeconomic inequality as matters of policy largely immune from scrutiny by the judicial branch.").
30
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American poverty law" and is embedded in the federal judiciary's broader retreat from
fundamental rights enforcement over the last forty years.32 This indifference to class
dictates a distinctive approach to positive socioeconomic rights as well as negative
protections against discriminatory state action.
With respect to positive rights, American constitutional law unambiguously rejects
any affirmative claim to minimal material security33 despite repeated calls for the recognition of such interests. 34 As then-judge Antonin Scalia wrote in 1986, "It is impossible to say that our constitutional traditions mandate the legal imposition of even so
basic a precept of distributive justice as providing food to the destitute."s3 Most
generally, the doctrine is but one manifestation of a broader conception of the Constitution as a guarantor of negative rights that imposes no affirmative duty on the state
to protect or sustain the populace. In particular, the absence ofpositive socioeconomic
rights reflects the fact that the Constitution lacks express language addressing such
One ofthe few exceptions to this principle is the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions, which
imposes an affirmative state obligation to provide representation for indigent defendants.
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,
17-19 (1956). The Court has also barred economic discrimination in the exercise ofthe franchise. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1966). Outside the context of
criminal prosecutions and the right to vote, however, American constitutional law is generally
indifferent to the fact that poverty may impair or preclude the exercise of other rights. See,
e.g., infra notes 58-59.
3 See Nice, No Scrutiny, supranote 7, at 629-36.
32 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, TheDeconstitutionalizationofEducation,36 LoY. U. CHI.

L.J. 111, 123-24 (2004) (discussing deconstitutionalization of education-related interests of
racial minorities and the poor); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the
ConstitutionalCommonLaw, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117, 1118-20 (1978) (discussing the deconstitutionalization of criminal procedure); Richard K. Sherwin, RhetoricalPluralismand the
DiscourseIdeal: CounteringDivisionofEmployment v. Smith, A ParableofPagans,Politics,
andMajoritarianRule, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 388, 423-24 (1991) (discussing "the Court's de-

constitutionalization of basic aspects of the freedom of religious conscience").
" See, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) ("The
Constitution is a charter of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not
require the federal government or the state to provide services, even so elementary a service
as maintaining law and order."); Robin West, Katrina,the Constitution,andthe Legal Question

Doctrine,81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1127, 1134-35 (2006).
3 See, e.g., CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., ANEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HuMAN RIGHTS, NAMED
AND UNNAMED 141-65 (1997); Peter B. Edelman, The Next Century of Our Constitution:
Rethinking Our Duty to the Poor, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 19-43 (1987); Frank I. Michelman,

The Supreme Court 1968 Term-Foreword:On ProtectingthePoorThrough the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles A. Reich, Individual Rights and Social
Welfare: The EmergingLegallssues,74 YALEL.J. 1245, 1254-56 (1965); Lawrence G. Sager,
Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of ConstitutionalLaw, 88 Nw. U. L.
REV. 410, 429-33 (1993).
* Antonin Scalia, Scalia Speaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986, at C2.
36 See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768-69 (2005); DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); West, supra note 33, at 1134-35.
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interests," unlike the majority of constitutions enacted in the modem era, as well
as a national sentiment that is relatively unreceptive to redistributionist principles39 and
an increasingly conservative Supreme Court that for forty years has emphatically
rejected any reading of the Constitution that might accommodate such values.4 0
This defining characteristic of the American approach to social welfare contrasts
with the recognition by most comparable constitutional states of some minimal interest
in health, education, and material security as an element ofprotected human dignity.4 1
The Italian Constitutional Court, for example, has held that "the right to health. .. [is]
protected by the [Italian] Constitution as an inviolable part of human dignity. There
can be no question that the right of poorer citizens.. . to free health care comes under
this heading.' 2 German constitutional doctrine likewise exempts from taxation "income that is minimally necessary for a humane existence-a 'subsistence minimum...."'" The law of most European nations follows suit," and the obligations
imposed by the leading international treaty on socioeconomic rights bind most other
nations to similar commitments.4 5 Conspicuously, the United States is not among the
160 states that are party to the agreement. 46
" Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees?,56 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 3-4, 8 (2005).
38 Id. at
4.
" See, e.g., id. at 17-19; cf Dennis Jacobe,Americans OpposeIncomeRedistributionTo Fix
Economy, GALLUP (June 27, 2008), http://www.gallup.com/poll/108445/americans-oppose
-income-redistribution-fix-economy.aspx (noting that 84% of surveyed adults oppose taking

steps to distribute wealth more evenly among Americans).
40 Sunstein, supra note 37, at 19-23; Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 123-24.
See MARK TUSHNET, WEAK COURTS, STRONG RIGHTS 220 (2008).
Corte Cost., 16 Luglio 1999, n. 309, Racc. uff. corte cost. 1999, 29 (It.), translatedin
NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1363 (2d ed. 2010).
43 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Nov. 10, 1998, 99
ENTSCHEDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVerfGE] 216 (Ger.), translatedin
DORSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1354.
4
See, e.g., DORSEN ET AL., supra note 42, at 1354; TUSHNET, supra note 41, at 220;
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 3-4.
45 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, openedforsignature
Dec. 16, 1966,993 U.N.T.S. 3 (enteredintoforce Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]; see, e.g.,
John H. Knox, Climate ChangeandHuman Rights Law, 50 VA. J. INT'LL. 163, 201 (2009).
41

42

Article 11 ofthe Covenant recognizes "the right ofeveryone to an adequate standard of living
for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous

improvement of living conditions." ICESCR art. 11, 11. Articles 12 and 13 recognize corollary
rights to health and education. ICESCR art. 12, 13. In view of these provisions, "a State party
in which any significant number of individuals is deprived ofessential foodstuffs, ofessential
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic forms of education is,
prima facie, failing to discharge its obligations under the Covenant." U.N. Comm. on Econ.,
Soc. and Cultural Rights [CESCRI, Gen. CommentNo. 3, para. 10, U.N. Doc. E/1991/22-E
/CN.4/1991/1 Annex III (1990).
46 U.N. Treaty Collection, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSGNolume%201/Chapter%/ 2OV/IV-3.en.pdf. The
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The formal irrelevance of class in the American system also bears on the scope
of the poor's negative protections against discriminatory state action. Under equal
protection doctrine, special scrutiny is brought to bear on discriminatory enactments
that draw suspect classifications.47 To qualify as suspect, a legislative classification
must target a class that is "saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.'
For decades scholars have made the case that indigence meets these core criteria and
that the poor accordingly should be entitled to heightened scrutiny when challenging
class-based legislative burdens.49 While the Supreme Court briefly flirted with the
idea,so it ultimately and definitively rejected the proposition in Dandridgev. Williams5'
and a series of subsequent cases in which the Court withdrew entirely from the field and
suspended review ofvirtually all discriminatory classifications burdening the poor.52
As John Hart Ely summarized, "the retreat from the once glittering crusade to extend
special constitutional protection to the poor has turned into a rout.", 3 Discriminatory
enactments targeting the indigent accordingly receive the lowest and most permissive
degree of scrutiny, requiring only that there be some conceivably rational basis for the
government to burden the poor as it has.54 As a practical matter, this prohibits little
more than legislative animus."
United States signed the ICESCR in 1977 but the Senate never ratified the treaty. Id; see
Sunstein, supra note 37, at 15.
47 San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
48 San Antonio, 411 U.S. at 28; see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974);
William D. Araiza, Democracy,Distrust,andthe PublicTrust: Process-BasedConstitutional
Theory, the Public TrustDoctrine,andthe SearchforaSubstantiveEnvironmental Value, 45

UCLA L. REv. 385, 415-16 (1997).
49 See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supranote 25, at 117-30; Edelman, supra note 34;
Loffredo, supranote 9, at 1306-13; Michelman, Forward,supranote 34, at 21; Lawrence Sagar,
TightLittle Islands:ExclusionaryZoning,EqualProtection,andthe Indigent,21 STAN. L. REV.

767, 785-87 (1969).
"0 See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968);
Harper v. Va. State Bd. ofElections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956);
cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
" 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
52 Id. at 487; see, e.g., Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450,458 (1988); Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,471 (1977); Jefferson v.
Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 548-51 (1972); Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1306-13 (summarizing
case authority).

" JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 148 (1980).

See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660 (1973); Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 508
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
5s See West, supranote 33, at 1137 ("Thus, it is arguable, given our doctrine, that legislators
cannot deny to poor people rights or privileges or goods solely on the grounds oftheir poverty,
where that poverty bears no relation to any legitimate public purpose."); cf Loffiredo, supranote
9, at 1283-84.
54
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The practical consequences of this doctrinal indifference cut sharply against the
interests of the poor. As commentators have often observed, the construed Constitution's formal neutrality on questions of class is highly discriminatory in its secondary
substantive effects 5 6 -an elaboration ofAnatole France's familiar remark that the law
in its "majestic equality ... forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to
beg in the streets, and to steal their bread."" Without the minimal resources necessary
to access and exercise rights, the promise of formal neutrality is substantively hollow:
a poor woman cannot exercise her right to abortion if she cannot purchase the procedure,58 nor can the poor exercise equal rights ofpolitical participation ifthey cannot buy
access to the conversation itself.59 Likewise, without heightened negative protections
against discriminatory legislation, the poor are at the practical mercy of lawmakers
whose political debts rarely trace back to empty pockets. Robert Bork's infamous
assertion in 1979 that "the poor and the minorities .. . have done very well" in the political process, and thus need no special protection from it,"o has been reduced to malevolent farce by the intervening three decades of legislative animosity and escalating
distress among America's indigent.6 '
The rights deficit ofthe American poor influences the terms ofpolitical discourse
as well. Irrespective ofthe degree to which positive socioeconomic rights are judicially
enforceable-and there is great disparity in that regard among nations recognizing
such interests 62 -the mere articulation of a right can legitimate corresponding claims
in the political sphere. Citing the experience of South Africa, Frank Michelman
56 See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, ClusterIll-Introduction,55 FLA. L.REv. 319,334-35 (2003);
West, supra note 33, at 1138.
" ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (Winifred Stephens trans., John Lane Co. 1914)
(1894).
8 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 434 U.S. 464,470-71
(1977).
" See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48 (1976) (rejecting as illegitimate any "governmental
interest in equalizing the relative [economic] ability ofindividuals and groups to influence the

outcome of elections [as an incident of the First Amendment].").
Robert H. Bork, The ImpossibilityofFinding Welfare Rights in the Constitution,1979
WASH. U. L.Q. 695, 701 ("The premise that the poor or the black are underrepresented politically
60

is quite dubious. In the past two decades we have witnessed an explosion ofwelfare legislation,
massive income redistributions, and civil rights laws of all kinds.... [T]he welfare-rights theory
rests less on demonstrated fact than on a liberal shibboleth.").
See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 376-80; Julie A. Nice, Forty Years of Welfare Policy
Experimentation:No Acres, No Mule, No Politics,No Rights, 4 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 1, 4-5,
9, 12 (2009) [hereinafter Forty Years]; Mark R. Rank, Rethinking the Scope and Impact of
Poverty in the United States, 6 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 165, 170-76 (2007).
62 See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Social Welfare Rights and the Forms ofJudicialReview, 82
TEX. L. REv. 1895, 1898-1909 (2004).
63 See, e.g., id at 1901; cf Kimberl6 Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: TransformationandLegitimationin AntidiscriminationLaw, 101 HARV. L. REv. 133 1,
1364-65 (1988).
61
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describes how merely declaratory socioeconomic rights supply "a useful basis on which
to engage governments in a kind of public cross-examination oftheir relevant laws and
policies."" Julie Nice conversely notes that the rights deficit in the American context
contributes to "a dialogic default on the very question of economic justice.'6 As Nice
argues, the inability ofthe American poor to ground political advocacy in rights rhetoric
has frustrated their claims to social and economic inclusion, which in turn has reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of corresponding claims in the judicial context.66
B. The Veiled Constitution and Class Bias

As the preceding sketch suggests, the declared Constitution is unapologetically
indifferent to class. Proponents concede that the doctrine offers scant hope for the poor
but assert that the case for distributive justice is moral, not constitutional, and thus must
be made outside the judicial sphere. In this respect, the law as it relates to poverty
is overtly deconstitutionalized; it frankly acknowledges the irrelevance of class and
accepts with relative candor the harsh substantive implications of that precept. As
others have thoroughly documented, it is a jurisprudence that defies the effects of
poverty on the exercise of basic rights while failing to "center[] class in the judicial
analysis or creat[e] a humane and robust constitutional jurisprudence for socioeconomic disparity.""

For all of its manifest failings, however, the doctrine of class indifference is at least
transparent: the law does what it purports to do. From the perspective of adjudicative
integrity, it is obviously quite a different matter when a jurisprudence is not merely unmoved by the brutal consequences of its stated terms but instead skews or misrepresents
the terms themselves to prejudice a particular class ofdisfavored litigants. This reaches
beyond class indifference to the question of veiled bias and the subconstitutional status
of the American poor. The articulation and enforcement of fundamental rights so as
to withhold from the poor the full force of generally applicable guarantees is not merely
an offense to the indigent but to the core legitimating principle of American constitutionalism: that the "equality of formal rights" will be "scrupulously maintained."69
4 Frank Michelman, Economic PowerandtheConstitution,in THE CONSTITUTION IN2020,
at 45, 52 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, eds., 2009).
6' Nice, Forty Years, supranote61, at 9; cf Jack M. Balkin, How Social Movements
Change

(orFailto Change) the Constitution:The Caseofthe New Departure,39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
27 (2005).
6
See Nice, No Scrutiny, supra note 7, at 662-63; Nice, Forty Years, supra note 61, at 9

("Poor people seem trapped in a perpetual stalemate: without rights, no politics and without
politics, no rights.").
67 See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENTDOMAIN 319-24 (1985); Antonin Scalia, ScaliaSpeaks, WASH. POST, June 22, 1986,
at C2 ("[T]he moral precepts ofdistributive justice . .. surely fall within the broad middle range
of moral values that may be embodied in law but need not be.").
68 Bames & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 112.
69

Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1358.
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For several decades, scholars writing in areas across the rights spectrum have
drawn attention to the veiled subordination of the poor through the enforcement of
purportedly neutral doctrine."o Without attempting to classify the diverse manifestations of this bias, it is useful to distinguish generally between two particular ways in

which the subordinating process plays out. First, the articulation of certain constitutional doctrines itself embeds socioeconomic bias." In such cases, the law is enforced
on its stated terms but the terms themselves skew constitutional enforcement against
the interests of the poor.72 Second, and most threatening to the claim of legitimate
adjudication, are instances where the judiciary subordinates the rights of the poor by
simply ignoring or grossly misrepresenting the articulated doctrine itself.73 Both of

these processes are relevant to the poor's inferior relationship with the Fourth Amendment's privacy right.74
There are two dimensions ofprotected privacy under the Fourth Amendment, each
reflecting a different aspect of enforcement bias. First, the articulated doctrine protects
what the Supreme Court characterizes as "reasonable expectation[s] of privacy."" This
formulation embeds socioeconomic bias in the terms of the doctrine itself insofar as the
construction of "reasonableness" reflects a particular set of social arrangements and
76an
assumptions that largely excludes the experience of the American poor. Second, and
70 See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, StandardsforConstitutionalReviewofPrivacy-Invading
Welfare Reforms: DistinguishingtheAbortion-FundingCasesandRedeeming the Undue-Burden
Test, 49 VAND. L. REv. I (1996) (discussing "dual system" of constitutional enforcement in the
context ofsubstantive due process rights); McCluskey, supranote 30, at 1057; Nice, No Scrutiny,
supranote 7, at 65 0-55; Jacobus tenBroek, Calfornia'sDualSystem OfFamilyLaw: Its Origin,
Development, andPresentStatus, 16 STAN. L. REv. 257 (1964) (Part I), 16 STAN. L. REV. 900
(1964) (Part 1I), and 17 STAN. L. REv. 614 (1965) (Part III).
' The doctrine of formal indifference also implicates socioeconomic bias insofar as it
ignores the practical impossibility of exercising certain fundamental rights without material
resources. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. In that respect, however, the doctrine
discriminates against the poor in its secondary effect, as the enforced law interacts with the
underlying material conditions of poverty; its enforcement in the first instance is classneutral. In contrast, the discriminatory impact discussed here is a primary effect the doctrine:
the law directly differentiates based on class and distributes its protections unequally in its
immediate application.
72 See, e.g., McCluskey, supra note 30, at 1043-57; infra Part I.B.1.
n See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 385-403; infra Part I.B.2.
74

See, e.g., Budd, supra note 10, at 385-403; Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalizationof

Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 708 (2009); Nice, No Scrutiny, supranote 7, at
652-55; Slobogin, supra note 13, at 392; William J. Stuntz, The Distributionof Fourth
Amendment Privacy,67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1265 (1999) [hereinafter FourthAmendment
Privacy]; William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 1795, 1822-24
(1998) [hereinafter Race, Class, and Drugs].
" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,360-61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001).
16 See William J. Stuntz, The PoliticalConstitutionofCriminalJustice, 119 HARV. L. REv.
780, 798 (2006) [hereinafter PoliticalConstitution].
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at its textual core,77 the Fourth Amendment protects certain uniquely inviolable physical
spaces per se-in particular, the home 8 and the person. In decisions that barely
attempt to reconcile with prevailing authority, the courts have simply refused to
safeguard the poor when facing intrusions upon these uniquely protected interests.o
We consider each of these dimensions of the privacy right in turn.
1. Bias Embedded in the Privacy Doctrine
The discriminatory effect of the Fourth Amendment's protection of "reasonable
expectations of privacy" is rooted in the formulation itself. The concept of reasonableness is irreducibly subjective; what may seem to be a reasonable expectation of
privacy to an indigent resident of a crowded tenement may seem entirely unreasonable to an affluent member of the federal bench. The Court attempts to address this
problem by declaring broadly that the relevant measure of reasonableness is the judgment of "society" generally."' But there is no isolable "society" in a nation as diverse
and divided as ours.82 Necessarily, then, the Court must choose among competing perspectives and experiences to resolve the reasonableness inquiry. As ChiefJudge Alex
Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit recently noted, the Court predictably chooses its own:
There's been much talk about diversity on the bench, but there's
one kind of diversity that doesn't exist: No truly poor people are
appointed as federal judges, or as state judges for that matter.
Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity or sex, are selected from the
class of people who don't live in trailers or urban ghettos. The
everyday problems of people who live in poverty are not close
n U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons [and]
houses .. . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . .").
7

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,590 (1980); see, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34; Wilson

v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,610 (1999); United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297,
313 (1972).
" Schmerberv. California, 384 U.S. 757,769-70 (1966); cf Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250,251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the
common law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person,
free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority
of law.").
80

See infra Part I.B.2 & Part II.D.3.

" Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Morgan
Cloud, Pragmatism,Positivism, andPrinciplesin FourthAmendment Theory, 41 UCLAL. REV.

199,250 (1993) ("[B]y asking whether the expectation in dispute is one society is willing to recognize as reasonable, the test's second prong implicitly encourages decisionmakers to define fimdamental constitutional values by referring to contemporary social values, goals, and attitudes.").
82

See, e.g., MICHAEL HARRINGTON, THE OTHER AMERICA 158-61 (Touchstone 1997)

(1962).
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to our hearts and minds because that's not how we and our
friends live."
Thus the Court, in giving specific content to the category of reasonable privacy expectations, relies on a set of assumptions about prevailing social norms and arrangements that bears little relationship to the lives of the poor.8 In particular, the Court
links the reasonableness ofprivacy expectations to "the existence of 'effective' barriers
to intrusion"ss upon occupied space itself-a consideration that largely overlaps with
the exercise of private property rights.86 In spaces where one exercises no power to bar
intrusions-the underside of a bridge, for example, or a park bench-the doctrine
accordingly offers negligible protection. Obviously this concept of reasonableness
works well for those who can retreat to the private confines of their homes, offices, or
judicial chambers, but it leaves very little protected privacy for individuals without a
home or who share their physical space with others.
Most of the American poor are not homeless, however, and have some private
space to call their own." Nevertheless, their ability to utilize that space for private
purposes is still differentially burdened by the reality that "the homes of the rich are
larger and more comfortable, making it possible to live a larger portion of life in them.
Privacy follows space, and people with money have more space than people without.""
With relatively less access to private space, the poor spend a greater proportion of their
lives in available common space-such as parks, playgrounds, sidewalks, and streets8 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of en banc review).

84

See, e.g., Stuntz, PoliticalConstitution,supranote 76, at 798; Stuntz, Race, Class, and

Drugs,supranote 74, at 1823-24 ("Existing social arrangements define the Fourth Amendment
baseline. This proposition has large distributive consequences, for people with money enjoy
more privacy than people without.").
8
86

Slobogin, supra note 13, at 401.

See Pineda-Moreno,617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting from the denial of
en banc rehearing) ("The very rich [are] able to protect their privacy with the aid of electric
gates, tall fences, security booths, remote cameras, motion sensors and roving patrols.. .. ");
cf Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,435 (1982) ("The power
to exclude has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner's
bundle of property rights.").
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("What a person knowingly exposes to
8
the public ... is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection."); see Slobogin, supra note

13, at 401.
8

See Ronald J. Bacigal, Some ObservationsandProposalson the Natureofthe Fourth

Amendment, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 529, 541-42 & nn.94-95 (1978); Slobogin, supranote
13, at 401; Stuntz, FourthAmendment Privacy, supra note 74, at 1266.
89 Jonathan L. Hafetz, Homeless LegalAdvocacy: New ChallengesandDirectionsforthe

Future,30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1215, 1223 (2003) (noting that between five and ten percent of
the poor experience homelessness in a given year).
90

Stuntz, Fourth Amendment Privacy,supra note 74, at 1270.
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where Fourth Amendment doctrine recognizes only limited privacy expectations.'
Necessarily then, the articulated doctrine, while neutral on its face, cuts powerfully
against the poor in its direct application.92
Speaking directly to his colleagues on the Ninth Circuit, Chief Judge Kozinski
recently decried this "unselfconscious cultural elitism"" in a case upholding the ability
ofpolice to surreptitiously attach a GPS tracking device to the underside of a car parked
in the driveway of a modest home:
[P]oor people are entitled to privacy, even if they can't afford all
the gadgets of the wealthy for ensuring it.... When you glide
your BMW into your underground garage or behind an electric
gate, you don't need to worry that somebody might attach a tracking device to it while you sleep. But the Constitution doesn't
prefer the rich over the poor; the man who parks his car next to his
trailer is entitled to the same privacy and peace of mind as the man
whose urban fortress is guarded by the Bel Air Patrol. 94
2. Bias Enforced on the Privacy Doctrine
The second dimension of protected privacy relates to the first but predates and
subsumes it. Historically, the Fourth Amendment privacy right has reserved its highest
protection for certain textually-specified spaces-most prominently, the home and the
person.95 While the Court declared that "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
9'

See id. at 1271-72.

This embedded bias is evident in other areas ofFourth Amendment doctrine as well. For
example, in establishing the "reasonable suspicion" ofwrongdoing required tojustify a search
or seizure, the Supreme Court has identified two factors that embed profound class bias. First,
the Court has held that mere presence in a "high-crime area" independently contributes to suspected wrongdoing. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000); Adams v. Williams, 407
U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972). This consideration applies in practice almost exclusively to poor
9

urban neighborhoods with high rates of street crime, thus placing an innocent poor person at

objectively greater risk of a permissible search than an identically situated individual in an
affluent community. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson & Damien Bemache, The "High-Crime
Area" Question:Requiring Verifiable andQuantiableEvidenceforFourthAmendmentReasonable Suspicion Analysis, 57 AM. U. L. REv. 1587, 1605-06 (2008); Margaret Raymond,
Down on the Corner, Out in the Street: Consideringthe Characterof the Neighborhoodin
EvaluatingReasonable Suspicion,60 OHIO ST. L.J. 99, 137-38 (1999). This bias is exacerbated

by the Court's identification of"evasive" behavior as an additional factor contributing to reasonable suspicion. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124. Given that "contact with the police can itself
be dangerous" for the urban poor, "unprovoked flight [by an innocent person] is neither 'aberrant' nor 'abnormal."' Id at 132-33 (Stevens, J., concurring).
" United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting from the denial of en banc rehearing).
94

Id.

9

See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
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places,"" when it announced the reasonable expectation standard in 1967, it has subsequently and repeatedly underscored the singular protections afforded the home and
the person without first filtering its analysis through the lens of reasonable expectations." This reflects the indisputably protected status of these intimate spaces; it is
axiomatic that individuals possess the highest expectation of privacy within their
dwellings and with respect to their bodies, and the doctrine takes that premise as a
starting point.98
Nevertheless, the federal courts have withheld from the poor the full reach of these
doctrinally unambiguous protections as well. In the absence of any credible basis to
subordinate the interests of the poor in this respect, the courts have simply ignored or
distorted otherwise applicable authority.99 This doctrinal subterfuge has played out
primarily in the context of the poor's privacy within the home-the location of the
Fourth Amendment's "ultimate protection."' 00 The long tradition of respecting the
sanctity of the home' follows an equally long tradition of excluding the indigent from
the full reach of that protection,'O2 and the decisions of both the Supreme Court and the
intermediate appellate courts reflect the disjuncture.'
The Supreme Court spoke directly to the poor's domestic privacy rights in its 1971
decision in Wyman v. James,'" which addressed the constitutionality of mandatory
home visits conducted by welfare caseworkers.' 5 In upholding the practice, Wyman
departed from Fourth Amendment doctrine in two significant respects. First, the Court
concluded that the visits were not "searches" at all within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment-and thus were not subject to constitutional review-because of their

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
" Regarding the home, see, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,610 (1999); Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573,590 (1980). Regarding the body, see, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 303 (1999); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968).
98 Id; see, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[A] person's body and home [are] areas afforded the greatest Fourth Amendment
protection."); cf Erik G. Luna, Sovereignty andSuspicion,48 DUKEL.J. 787, 847-56 (1999);
9

Stephanie M. Stem, The InviolateHome: HousingExceptionalismin the FourthAmendment,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 912 (2010).

" See infra notes 104-55 and accompanying text.
United States v. Haqq, 278 F.3d 44, 54 (2d Cir. 2002).

oo

lor
102

See Budd, supra note 10, at 359-63.
Id. at 363-68.

103 The one contemporary appellate opinion addressing the poor's parallel right of bodily
privacy disparaged that interest as well but was reversed by an equally divided en banc court.
Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,judgment
vacated,319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc), rev'dby an equally dividedcourt,60 F. App'x
601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). That decision, addressing the permissibility ofmandatory drug
testing as a condition of public assistance, is discussed in detail in Part II.D.3.
'4 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
'os Id at 310.
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predominantly rehabilitative (as opposed to investigatory) character and the fact that
they purportedly occurred by consent.' This conclusion defied otherwise applicable
authority establishing that the presence or absence of criminal consequences has no
bearing on whether an intrusion constitutes a Fourth Amendment search,'07 and that
consent, if any, serves not to eliminate a search but to validate it.'os Accordingly, the
Court was "unquestionably incorrect in its assertion that a home visit is not a search."'"
The second rationale offered in Wyman was equally suspect. Assuming arguendo
that home visits fell within the reach of the Fourth Amendment, the Court offered an
"ad hoc""o list ofreasons why the suspicionless and warrantless searches were nonetheless reasonable."' The enumerated factors-including the non-criminal nature of the
visit, the friendly attitude of the caseworkers, and the state's interests in fiscal integrity
and the welfare of poor children'12-offered virtually no doctrinal support for the conclusion that the visits constituted a permissible entry in the absence of a warrant or suspicion."' Wyman thus stood in obvious conflict with the surrounding body of Fourth
Amendment law, and the "glaring inconsistency" was not lost on the lower courts.'14
As Christopher Slobogin notes, its analysis is coherent only "on the ground that the
homes of people on welfare get less Fourth Amendment protection."" 5
Wyman, however, was limited in its scope. The Court stressed that its conclusions
turned upon the rehabilitative"' and non-invasive"' nature of the visit, which in the
Court's estimation more closely approximated an interaction with "a friend to one in
need" than an adversarial encounter with the state."' Whether or not one accepts that
characterization,"' the analysis clearly does not extend to endorse highly invasive investigative intrusions by law enforcement officers for the sole purpose ofuncovering

'06
17

Id. at 3 17-18.
See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,226 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting); Camara

v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
108 Cf Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
'0
§ 10.3(a) (4th ed. 2004).
"o Wyman, 400 U.S. at 341 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 318-26 (majority opinion).
112 id
"' See Budd, supra note 10, at 369-73.
114 Reyes v. Edmunds, 472 F. Supp. 1218, 1224 (D. Minn. 1979); see,
e.g., Blackwelder v.

Safnauer, 689 F. Supp. 106, 140-41 (N.D.N.Y. 1988).
Slobogin, supra note 13, at 403.
"1 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317, 319-21, 323; see Budd, supra note 10, at 386-87.
"
Wyman, 400 U.S. at 321; see Budd, supra note 10, at 393-94.
"1 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 323; see Gustafson, supra note 74, at 700.
"9 See, e.g., Sherry F. Colb, The QualitativeDimension ofFourthAmendment "Reasonableness,"98 COLUM. L. REv. 1642, 1720-22 (1998); Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric ofPoverty:
Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L. J. 1499, 1522-25 (1991).
"'
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evidence of ineligibility or fraud.' 20 However, those are precisely the practices that the
intermediate courts have recently read Wyman to sanction.121
In the wake of federal welfare-reform legislation devolving administrative authority
for public assistance to state and local governments,'22 manyjurisdictions have utilized
their new discretion to impose exceptionally harsh verification procedures on aid applicants and recipients.'23 Among the requirements is an updated variant of the Wyman
home visit that lacks virtually all of its moderating characteristics. 24 The prototype for
these new home visits is San Diego County's "Project 100%," which employs investigative practices that are among "the most aggressive in the country."' 2 5 As a condition
ofpublic assistance, all aid applicants in the county must agree to an unscheduled home
visit by a sworn law-enforcement investigator from the District Attorney's Public Assistance Fraud Division.'26 Refusal to permit the visit or to accept the scope of the investigator's inspection results in the denial of benefits.'2 7 The visit itself is exclusively
for investigatory purposes and has no rehabilitative component.' 28 Once in the home,
the investigator's discretion is unlimited and any area of the home is subject to inspection. 29 investigators accordingly rifle through dresser drawers, medicine cabinets,
closets, and refrigerators,' 3 0 all in search of evidence of ineligibility or fraud.' 3 '

See, e.g., Sanchez v. Cnty. ofSan Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc); Budd, supra note 10, at 386-95.
121 Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 918-19, 923-25 (9th Cir.
2006); S.L. v.
120

Whitburn, 67 F.3d 1299, 1306-11 (7th Cir. 1995); cf Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors,
128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712-14 (Ct. App. 2002).
122

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),

Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see Matthew
Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration:Rules, Discretion,and Entrepreneurial
Government, 75 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1121,1145-86(2000); William P. Quigley, Backwards into
the Future:How Welfare Changes in the Millenium Resemble EnglishPoorLaw ofthe Middle
Ages, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 101, 102 (1998).
123 See Amy Mulzer, Note, The Doorkeeper and the GrandInquisitor: The Central Role of
VerificationProceduresin Means-Tested Welfare Programs,36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.

663, 674-78 (2005).
See Budd, supra note 10, at 379-85.
Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
126 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 918-20; Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 2003 WL 25655642,
at *2 (S.D. Cal. March 10, 2003), ajJ'd, 464 F.3d 916.
127 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2.
128 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; see id. at 935 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
129 Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *8 n.8 ("[N]o specific protocol limits where the
inves124

125

tigator may look. . . .").
Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 919; id. at 936 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
Sanchez, 2003 WL 25655642, at *2, *8 n.8; Plaintiffs-Appellants' Opening Brief at
9-10, Sanchez, 464 F.3d 916 (No. 04-55122), 2004 WL 1949000, at *23-25.
30

''
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In Sanchez v. County of San Diego,13 2 the Ninth Circuit relied on the "radically
different"'33 facts of Wyman as controlling authority for the conclusion that Project
100% does not even implicate the Fourth Amendment search doctrine 3 4-or, in the
alternative, that its practices are a reasonable exercise ofthe search power in the absence
of suspicion or a warrant.' Other courts have reached the same holding on similar
facts.' 36 To equate Wyman 's friendly visit with an adversarial search by sworn fraud
investigators, however, defies any plausible comparison.' As seven circuit judges
noted in their dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc in Sanchez, "The differences
between San Diego's program and the program in Wyman are of a quality and character that cannot be ignored.... [T]he simple fact of the matter is that a home visit in
Sanchez is fundamentally different from a home visit in Wyman."'
There is a second reason why Wyman cannot support these contemporary search
practices: it no longer states the relevant Fourth Amendment standard for the intrusions
at issue. 13 Idiosyncratic from the start, Wyman was long ago superseded by the specialneeds doctrine as the appropriate analytic framework within which to assess warrantless
and suspicionless searches for purposes unrelated to law enforcement." Under the
special-needs analysis, courts engage in a reasonableness calculation that directly balances the magnitude of the threatened privacy loss against the weight of the state's
countervailing interest in the search at issue.' 4 ' Under prevailing authority, this balancing calculation cannot possibly authorize the practices at issue in San Diego and
related jurisdictions.' 42 On one side of the equation is a privacy interest of the highest
order-the sanctity of the home itself. "' On the other side of the equation is an entirely
pedestrian administrative objective-the state's general interest in the fiscal integrity
464 F.3d 916. Before joining the faculty ofUniversity ofNew Hampshire School ofLaw,
the author served as Legal Director ofthe ACLU Foundation of San Diego &Imperial Counties
and in that capacity represented the plaintiff class in Sanchez.
1
Id. at 938 (Fisher, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 921 ("Wyman directly controls the instant case.").
132

'"

See id. at 923-25.

S.L. v. Whitbum, 67 F.3d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1995) ("We are bound by Wyman"); see
also id at 1306-11; cf Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700,712-14
(Ct. App. 2002).
13

"n

See Budd, supra note 10, at 386-95.

Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
13s

" See, e.g., Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 922 n.8.
See generally Budd, supra note 10, at 395-97; Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special
Needs "andtheFourthAmendment: An ExceptionPoisedto Swallow the WarrantPreference
140

Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 529 (1997).
141 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
142
143

See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text; see also Part II.D. 1.

See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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of a benefits program'"-that falls well outside the relatively narrow range ofpublic
safety' 5 and in locoparentisl46concerns that the Court has recognized as sufficient to
justify a special needs search. 14
In the face of this doctrinal impediment, the Ninth Circuit simply distorted both
sides of the analytic equation.14 8 As to the privacy interest at stake, the Sanchez court
explicitly equated welfare recipients with convicted felons to establish the proposition
that the poor have a diminished expectation of privacy within their homes-citing as
controlling authority a case that permits a state's penal authorities to search the home
of a probationer without a warrant. 149 Taking a slightly different tack, other courts have
returned to Wyman as authority for some generalized diminution in the expectation of
privacy of all welfare recipients, simply by virtue of their receipt of a public benefit.5 0
Stating the obvious but to no avail, the dissenting judge in Sanchez reminded his colleagues that "unlike convicted felons, welfare applicants have no lesser expectation of
privacy in their homes than the rest of us.""'
On the other side of the equation, Sanchez and related cases have declared that the
state's pedestrian fiscal interests are sufficient to support the intrusions at issue, despite
the absence of any special-needs authority to support the assertion, and have notably
failed to acknowledge the broader consequences of their reasoning. 152 If the state may
search the home of any recipient of a public benefit merely to verify compliance with
administrative requirements, the search power is essentially unlimited in its application
to the general population-since it is exceedingly difficult to find anyone who is not
a recipient of some public benefit, subsidy, credit, or deduction that depends in part
on representations about conditions within one's home.5' Of course, the prospect of
'
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 483 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J.,
dissenting from denial of en banc review).
145 See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 674 (1989); Skinner, 489
U.S. at 634; Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987); cf Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S.
305,323 (1997) ("[W]here, as in this case, public safety is not genuinely injeopardy, the Fourth
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently arranged."); Bd.
of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 836-37 (2002).
146 Earls, 536 U.S. at 836-37; Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654-57

(1995).
117 See, e.g., Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309 (referring to the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches").
148 See Budd, supra note 10, at 397-403.
1
Sanchez v. Cnty. of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916,925 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987)).
"s S.L. v. Whitbum, 67 F.3d 1299, 1310 (7th Cir. 1995); Smith v. L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 700, 712 (Ct. App. 2002).
'' Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 940 (Fisher, J., dissenting); see Gustafson, supranote 74, at 708.
152 See Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 926; Whitburn, 67 F.3d at 1310; Smith, 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 712.
1'
See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 343 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Sanchez,
464 F.3d at 941 n.12 (Fisher, J., dissenting); Slobogin, supra note 13, at 403 ("Those
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the federal courts authorizing such a sweeping expansion of the search power is nonexistent as a practical and jurisprudential matter,'54 and it is beside the point to worry
about the possibility. Sanchez and related authorities do not threaten the broader security of Americans in their homes; they instead demonstrate that the poor stand alone,
beneath those protections, and face unique intrusions based on rationales that apply to
no one else."ss
3. Rationalizing Bias: Poverty as a Proxy for Cause
Unusual in several respects, these cases are notable in particular for the degree to
which they overtly mischaracterize controlling authority. This is not the way courts
typically go about their business,' 6 however politicized one believes them to be,' and
the holdings raise obvious questions regarding subjective motivation and intent. At
one end ofthe explanatory spectrum is simple malice-the possibility that the decisions
arise from unvarnished class animus. Innumerable intermediate possibilities range
forward from that point, involving various shades and degrees of cognitive dissonance,
objectification, paternalism, and the like.' 8 At the far end of the spectrum is the possibility that the judges have no subjective sense whatsoever of how far outside the parameters of conventional adjudication these cases fall.159
suspected oftax fraud get full Fourth Amendment protection; those suspected ofwelfare fraud
get none."); Note, Ninth Circuit Upholds ConditioningReceipt of Welfare Benefits on Consent
to Suspicionless Home Visits-Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1996,

2003 (2007).
15 See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (observing that the
Fourth Amendment must be construed to prohibit suspicionless intrusions "from becoming
a routine part of American life.").
' See Sanchez, 483 F.3d 965,969 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of
en banc review).
' Cf Amanda Frost & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Counteringthe MajoritarianDifficulty, 96
VA.

L. REv. 719, 758-60 (2010).

.. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEINETAL., ARE JUDGES POLICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY
1'

17-57, 147-50 (2006).

Cf BradleyW. Joondeph, The Many Meaningsof "Politics"in JudicialDecisionMaking,

77 UMKC L. REv. 347,374 (2008) ("[J]udges' subjective motivations can only explain a part
what is going on in their decisions. Human beings are often, and perhaps mostly, unaware of
why they hold particular beliefs or choose certain courses of action.").
" Id. at 375 ("Thus, even ifjudges subjectively experience their decision-making as an
attempt to reach the most coherent, logical reading ofthe relevant legal authorities, their own
perceptions generally misapprehend much ofwhat actually determines their behavior. The judges
themselves can only see a part ofwhat moves them. No matter what they write in their opinions,

or how much they might protest to the contrary, there is much more to their choices than the objective interpretation of law. Forces external to the law and outside the judges' cognition shade
their interpretations of texts and precedent and frame their readings of history and tradition."
(footnote omitted)).

772

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:751

The complexity of the question is confounding, to say the least, and any effort to
address it would be an ambitious project of its own. There is, however, a related and
more modest inquiry that sheds some light on the internal logic of these decisions.
Presuming a judge were interested in rationalizing the outcomes as the product of
legitimate adjudication, any explanation would necessarily require some articulation
with the values of the Fourth Amendment itself. The narrower question, then, is how
might the wholesale suspension of the poor's domestic privacy rights be articulated
with those values-and, in particular, the Fourth Amendment's emphasis on individualized suspicion?'
A possible answer begins with the broader societal conception ofthe poor that contextualizes the decisions. As the literature exhaustively documents, the "able-bodied"
poor have been demonized for centuries as indolent, immoral, and intrinsically predisposed to their predicament."' This caricature traces back to the colonial era' 62 and has
played a central role in shaping the contemporary American ideology of class.163 Most
recently, the stereotypical account of the poor-and, more specifically, of welfare recipients-has taken the form of the mythical "welfare queen"'" or "welfare mother"'"
whose imagined exploits continue to shape the public debate surrounding issues of
socioeconomic justice.'66 Reinforcing this longstanding caricature has been the increasing isolation and residential segregation ofpoor Americans, who are now largely
invisible to broader society.'67 As the lives of the poor become more divorced from
the experience of others, the dehumanizing and reductionist force of the caricature
16

See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).

16

See, e.g., MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVEs OF WOMEN 144-45 (1988); Budd,

supranote 10, at 363-65; Gustafson, supranote 74, at 648-55; Quigley, supranote 122, at
105-06; William P. Quigley, Reluctant Charity: PoorLaws in the OriginalThirteen States,
31 U. RICH. L. REv. 111, 114 (1997) [hereinafter Reluctant Charity];Ross, supra note 119, at
1502-08; see generally MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (1986).
162

See Ann M. Burkhart, The ConstitutionalUnderpinningsofHomelessness, 40 Hous. L.

REv. 211, 221-22 (2003).
" See, e.g., HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 74-102 (1995); Ross, supra

note 119, at 1502-08.
'" See, e.g., Peter Edelman, The World After Katrina: Eyes Wide Shut?, 14 GEO. J. ON
POVERTYL. &POL'Y 1, 3-4 (2007); Gustafson,supranote 74, at 655-58; April Land, Children
in Poverty: In Search ofState andFederalConstitutionalProtectionsin the Wake of Welfare
"Reforms, " 2000 UTAH L. REv. 779, 811.
Anti-Poverty orAnti-Poor?,9 GEO. J. ON
16s Thomas W. Ross, The Faith-BasedInitiative:

POVERTY L. & POL'Y 167, 172 (2002).

'6 See, e.g., Gustafson, supra note 74, at 658-64; Ross, supranote 165, at 172.
167

See, e.g., HARRINGTON, supra note 82, at 2-7; Debra Lyn Bassett, DistancingRural

Poverty, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 3, 13 (2006) ("[Ploverty is literally out of sight as
well as outofmind."); David Ray Papke, Keeping the Underclassin its Place:Zoning, the Poor,
andResidentialSegregation,41 URB. LAw. 787, 788 (2009) ("[C]ontemporary American metropolitan areas remain overwhelmingly segregated by socioeconomic class.").
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correspondingly increasesl 6 8-- and the strengthening caricature, in turn, further intensifies the isolation of the poor.'69 Over time, the individual fades into the encompassing myth.
So objectified, welfare recipients as a class are understood to possess characteristics that evoke the reasonable suspicion and disdain of broader society. As Kaaryn
Gustafson has recently documented, these imputed qualities increasingly correspond
not merely with poverty but with criminality as well."o She notes that "welfare applicants are treated as presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves,""' and that federal and
state welfare laws increasingly "assume[] a latent criminality among the poor."' 72
Consistent with these assumptions, contemporary state and federal welfare policy is
punitive, adversarial, and distrustful."' Surveillance, sanctions, and verification "extremism" are now prominent characteristics of welfare administration,'74 all with the
intended purpose ofreducing the total number of individuals receiving relief'--either
by blocking entry to the programs at the front end"' or by terminating benefits as
quickly as possible."' Thus it comes as no surprise that the number of individuals
receiving federal welfare assistance has dropped precipitously"' as the poverty rate
escalates."' These outcomes coincide with the archaic notion that the immorality of
the poor is the ultimate cause of their plight and that the state's capacity and responsibility to ameliorate poverty is limited as a result. 80
This conception of the indigent influences judicial perceptions as well.'"' As
Thomas Ross notes, "When judges construct their arguments, they must depend on
"' See, e.g., Stephen Loffredo, Poverty,Inequality,and Classin the StructuralConstitutional
Law Course, 34 FORDHAMURB. L.J. 1239, 1247 (2007) ("This socially constructed otherness

of the poor is reinforced by (or perhaps serves as justification for) the social and spatial
isolation of low-income families in economically segregated neighborhoods and inferior
public schools.").
' See Ross, supra note 119, at 1503 ("[The poor] have been cast as different, deviant,

and morally weak. These assumptions make coherent the physical separation ofthe poor from
the affluent." (footnote omitted)).
170 Gustafson, supra note 74, at 665-66; see also CYNTHIA A. BRIGGS & JENNIFER L.
PEPPERELL, WOMEN, GIRLS, AND ADDICTION 126 (2009).
171 Gustafson, supra note 74,
at 646.
172 Id. at 647.
173 See id.
174 See id. at 646; Mulzer, supranote 123, at 674-78.
11 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)-(b) (2006); Diller, supra note 122, at 1178-84.
176 See, e.g., JOHN GILLIOM, OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND
THE LIMrrs OF PRIVACY 40 (2001).
"' See, e.g., Diller, supra note 122, at 1171, 1184.
"' See id. at 1123; Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism:Toward a
Community-Based Welfare System, 66 U. PITr. L. REV. 721, 741 & n.85 (2005); Land, supra
note 164, at 818.
17 See Rank, supra note 61, at 170-76.
"80 See, e.g., Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 25, at 125-26.
181 See, e.g., id.at 126; Budd,supranote 10, at403-06; Ross,supranote 119, at 1513-38.
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assumptions widely shared by their audience. Judges depend on these assumptions
both because they give their arguments power and the potential for influence, and because the judges, as members of the culture, are likely to believe them."' 82 The Fourth
Amendment's skewed application to the poor occurs against the backdrop of such assumptions, and considering the law in that broader context suggests a rough logic to
the judicial bias. If welfare recipients are understood in the collective (sub)consciousness as a malingering class of "liars, cheaters, and thieves,"l 83 it is then only a
small step to the conclusion that each among them merits suspicion by virtue of that
status. In this sense, the outcomes in Wyman, Sanchez and related cases begin to align
on some visceral level with the Fourth Amendment's normative allocation ofprivacy.
Quite simply, poverty serves as a proxy for cause, relieving the state of the obligation
to establish individualized suspicion when it seeks to search the homes-and perhaps
the bodies--of the intrinsically culpable poor.
To suggest that the popular conception of welfare recipients aligns with their
exclusion from specific Fourth Amendment protections is not to say that any judge
has purposively reasoned from one to the next. But it does imply that the deep and
wounding myth of the immoral poor has particular resonance for a doctrine that turns
on subjective judgments about the "reasonableness" of the state's suspicions. As
part of the context within which those judgments have been made, the caricature of
the poor may well have exerted some influence over the judiciary's decision to classify
welfare recipients as a presumptively suspect class-whether or not the courts consciously acknowledge the connection."*
II. POVERTY, PRIVACY, AND SUSPICIONLESs DRUG TESTING

The poor's exercise of Fourth Amendment privacy rights remains under siege.
Having authorized government to search the homes of welfare recipients without individualized suspicion or a warrant, the courts may soon be asked whether the bodies
of aid recipients are subject to similar intrusions. Over the last three years, proposals
to drug-test welfare recipients have emerged as a significant legislative trend across
the country."8' Introduced in just a few legislatures in 2007, drug testing legislation
appeared in over half of the states by 2009.1" The bills have garnered increasingly substantial support, with some having passed at least one legislative chamber.' Recently
1
8
'
1

116

'

Ross, supra note 119, at 1513.
Gustafson, supra note 74, at 646.
See supra notes 158-59.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra notes 284 & 287.
See, e.g., Tom Breen, Some States, IncludingMinn., Move TowardDrugTests For Wel-

fareRecipients, STARTRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minn.), Mar. 26,2009, http://www.startribune
.com/politics/state/41904442.html?elr-KArks:DCiUMcyaL nDaycUiacyKUUr; Terry Ganey,
SenateKeeps WelfareDrug-TestingItemFromAdvancing, COLUM. DAILY TRiB. (Columbia,
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members of Congress have joined the effort and introduced legislation requiring all
While very little
states to test recipients of federally-funded public assistance.'
attention has yet focused on this emerging development, it may soon present the
judiciary with an important occasion to revisit its treatment of the poor's right to
privacy under the Fourth Amendment. Involving suspicionless intrusions into one of
the two spheres of privacy at the apex of constitutional sanctity-the body itself-the proposals, if enacted, will require the courts to decide between two starkly
different visions of the privacy right.
A. Prelude:Federal Welfare Reform
The recent surge in mandatory drug testing proposals traces back to a provision
of federal welfare reform passed in 1996.189 Among a vast array of punitive provisions
that fundamentally altered the nature of federal public assistance,'90 the legislation expressly authorizes individual states to impose drug testing as a condition of aid: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, States shall not be prohibited by the Federal
Government from testing welfare recipients for use of controlled substances nor from
sanctioning welfare recipients who test positive for use of controlled substances. ... "'
This provision is one of several that address drug use among welfare recipients,
including a related measure that permits states to impose a lifetime ban on aid to individuals who have been convicted of certain drug-related offenses.' 92
1. The Premise of the Addicted Poor
The legislative debates attending the passage ofthe federal statute made clear that
its proponents fully embraced the disparaging caricature ofthe American poor as well
as the corollary proposition that state aid only exacerbates the problem. Injustifying
the legislation, a parade of representatives took to the floor to recite a litany of charges
Mo.), May 14,2009, http://www.columbiatribune.com/news/2009/may/14/senate-keeps-welfare
-drug-testing-item-from/; Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking
Drug Testing to Welfare Eligibility (Feb. 25, 2009), http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press-re
leases/pressreleases_2009/pr20090225c.html; S.Minutes, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. Feb. 11, 2008).
' Drug Free Families Act of 2009, S. 97, 111th Cong. § 2; Press Release, Sen. Orrin
Hatch, Hatch Introduces Amendment Requiring Drug Testing for Welfare, Unemployment
Benefits (June 15,2010), http://hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases
.Detail&PressRelease id=3d3elab4-lb78-be3e-e099-95c71cb7495e&Month=6&Year-2010.
89 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA),
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
19o

See, e.g., Gustafson, supra note 74, at 658-78.

21 U.S.C. § 862b (2009).
Id. § 862a(a). PRWORA also authorized substance abuse treatment as part of "an individual responsibility plan" for welfare recipients. 42 U.S.C. §608(b)(2)(A).
192

776

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:751

against the "welfare system"' and its recipient population. Speakers alleged that welfare teaches people "to depend on it and not to be able to depend on themselves,"l 94
"discourages thrift, discourages work, separates . .. and destroys families, isolates
children, and from an early age, stifles their ambition,"' creates an environment that
"is not ... morally healthy," 96 and "fosters poverty, despair, hopelessness, and illegitimacy."l 97 Others asserted that "the Federal Government is completely incapable of helping these people"' 98 and that welfare instead constitutes "federally funded
child abuse."'"9
Allegations of criminal behavior and drug abuse among welfare recipients were
high on the list of rationales recited in support of the bill.200 Representatives declared
that "[t]he high crime rates, the high drug abuse rates ... are very, very closely linked
to our welfare system,"20' while others decried "the destructive practice of giving ...
benefits to drug addicts and alcoholics, blighting their lives at great public expense."202
Poor children, whose "ideologues and ... role models are pimps and drug dealers,"203
were depicted as "selling drugs ... [and] killing each other." 2 0 It was, in short, a world
of "skyrocket[ing]" 205 crime, illegitimacy, "fraud, and abuse,"206 and Congress had a
"very straightforward" message in response: "No more money for nothing.... [G]et
a real job."207
While empirical data regarding drug abuse among the poor played little part in the
hyperbolic political debate, 20 8it is noteworthy that the correlation between poverty and
drug addiction is quite weak. Researchers analyzing data from the National Longitudinal Alcohol Epidemiologic Survey--described by the National Institutes of Health as
the "'gold standard' for estimating the prevalence of adult alcohol and other drug disorders" 209-- concluded in 1996 that "[p]roportions ofwelfare recipients using, abusing,
142 CONG. REC. 17674 (1996) (statement of Rep. Ensign).
Id. at 17603 (statement of Rep. Kasich).
'9 Id. at 17677 (statement of Rep. Traficant).
196 Id. at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).
11 Id. at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
'9

114

1'

Id. at 17618 (statement of Rep. Weldon).

9 Id at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).
200 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 4 (1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 104-725, at 490
(1996) (Conf. Rep.).
201 142 CONG. REC. 17618 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon).
202 Id. at 17674 (statement ofRep. English); see, e.g., id.(statement ofRep. Ensign)
("Should
we continue to give cash payments to prisoners and drug addicts?").
203 Id. at 17614 (statement of Rep. Cunningham).
204 Id. at 17683 (statement of Rep. Shays).
205 Id. at 17674 (statement of Rep. Ensign).
206 Id. at 17687 (statement of Rep. Buyer).
207 Id. at 17672 (statement of Rep. Zimmer).
208 See generally supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
209 Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofHealth and Human Servs., Nat'1 Insts.
ofHealth, NIAAA Researchers Estimate Alcohol and Drug Use, Abuse and Dependence Among Welfare Recipients
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or dependent on alcohol or illicit drugs are consistent with proportions of both the adult
U.S. population and adults who do not receive welfare."2 10 The researchers found that
the rate of alcohol abuse and/or dependence among welfare recipients ranged from 4.3
to 8.2 percent across five welfare programs, compared to a rate of 7.4 among the general population,21 1 while the rate of drug abuse and/or dependence among welfare
recipients ranged between 1.3 and 3.6 percent in comparison to a rate of 1.5 percent
among the broader population.212 Data from the National Household Survey of Drug
Abuse roughly coincides with these findings, with a rate of drug dependence among
welfare recipients in 1994 and 1995 of approximately four percent and a rate of alcohol
dependence of nine percent. 213 Perhaps most notably, the data suggests that no more
than one in five welfare recipients uses an illicit drug in any given year-and half of
those individuals use marijuana alone. 214 The depiction of aid recipients as welfareenabled drug addicts and the resulting statutory provisions authorizing drug testing
and related sanctions thus bear little relation to the actual lives of the American poor.
Finally, even ifpoverty did correlate with significantly higher rates of drug abuse
and addiction, the question ofcausation would remain: does the harsh reality ofpoverty
lead to drug use, or do reckless choices by individuals lead to addiction and then to
poverty as a secondary effect? 2 15 The answer obviously bears on the punitive rationality
of get-tough proposals denying assistance to impoverished applicants who test positive
for illicit drug use. There are "surprisingly few studies"21 6 that have examined this relationship, and what little research exists suggests that there "is not a direct, causal relationship between the two social problems, but instead one which is mitigated by a range
of complex factors, including characteristics ofthe agent (e.g., alcohol), ofthe person
(e.g., coping style), and of the environment (e.g., availability of substances, family
structure, lack ofjob opportunities)."2 17 Rather than grapple with this complexity and
factual uncertainty, federal welfare policy simply posits the politically expedient myth
that drug abuse among welfare recipients is a volitional choice reflecting a punishable
moral failure.2 18 To the extent that the policy thus denies assistance to debilitated
(Oct. 23, 1996), available at http://www.niaaa.nih.gov/newsevents/newsreleases/pages
/welfare.aspx.
210
211
212

Id.
Id
Id.

213 RuKMALJE JAYAKODY ET AL., SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND WELFARE REFORM

2 (Nat'l
Poverty Ctr., Policy Brief Ser. No. 2, Apr. 2004), availableat http://www.npc.umich.edu/pub
lications/policybriefs/brief02/brief2.pdf
Id.
See, e.g., NancyJ. Smyth & Kathleen A. Kost, Exploringthe Natureofthe Relationship
Between Poverty andSubstanceAbuse: Knowns and Unknowns, 1J. HUM. BEHAv. Soc. ENV'T
214
21

67 (1998).
216 Id. at
78.
217

218

Id.
See supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text.
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applicants whose drug use is enmeshed with the trauma of poverty, it simply exacerbates their misfortune.219
2. The Premise of State Dominion
Just as the 1996 federal legislation posits a caricature of the addicted poor, so too
it rests on a longstanding conception of the state's dominion over the private lives of
welfare recipients. For centuries, the assistance of the state has come at the sacrifice
ofpersonal autonomy. 220 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, for example, those
in need of public assistance were regularly auctioned off or indentured as laborers,
barred from moving to new communities, and functionally imprisoned in poorhouses. 22' The process extended to children as well, whose labor could be auctioned
to pay a parent's debts.222 In the early twentieth century, officials continued to closely
regulate the intimate lives ofaid recipients-raiding their homes at night to search for
male visitors, barring evening dates for women receiving assistance,224 and mandating
religious instruction for dependent children.225 Investigators assessed the "suitability"
of applicants and denied aid based on "use of tobacco, lack of church attendance, dishonesty, drunkenness, housing a male lodger, extramarital relations, poor discipline,
criminal behavior, child delinquency, and overt child neglect. Agencies even forced
families to move from neighborhoods with questionable reputations." 226 Some of these
practices continued through the 1950s and 1960s, including most notably the use of
surprise midnight raids in search of male guests.227
This tradition of intrusion has extended to the bodily autonomy of welfare recipients, as several scholars have observed in the context of reproductive choice.228 In the
last twenty years, policymakers have considered a long list of measures linking the level
and availability ofwelfare benefits to marital status, 229 limitations on childbearing, 230
219 See, e.g., Harold A. Pollacket al., Substance Use Among Welfare Recipients: Trends and
Policy Responses, 76 Soc. SERV. REv. 256, 261 (2002).
220 See, e.g., GILLIOM, supra note 176,
at 22-24.
221

See id. at 23-24; Quigley, Reluctant Charity,supra note 161, at 140-75.

See Burkhart,supra note 162, at 223.
223 See Jonathan L. Hafetz, "AMan's Home Is His Castle?": Reflections on the Home, the
Family,andPrivacyDuringthe LateNineteenth andEarly Twentieth Centuries,8 WM. &MARY
J. WOMEN & L. 175, 208-09 (2002).
224 See id. at 222-23.
225 See GiLLIOM, supra note 176, at 25.
226 ABRAMOViTZ, supra note 161, at 202.
227 See id. at 324-25; GtLLIoM, supra note 176, at 31-32.
228 See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only GoodPoorWoman: Unconstitutional
Conditions
and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. Rrv. 931 (1995); Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology ofDivision:
Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719 (1992).
222

229

See Williams, supra note 228, at 720.

230

See Rebekah J. Smith, FamilyCaps in Welfare Reform: Their CoerciveEffects andDam-

aging Consequences, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 151, 152-54 (2006).
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the use of contraception, 231 and even "the sterilization of women on welfare as a condition of receiving benefits."232 As Lucie White observes, "these kinds of 'welfare
reform' provisions [relate] back to this country's long history of targeting the reproductive autonomy of poor women, particularly women of color. The powerful have
repeatedly marshalled state power to use the bodies of poor women to further their
own economic and symbolic ends." 233 Federal legislation permitting states to physically
intrude upon the bodies of welfare recipients for purposes of invasive extraction procedures continues quite literally in this incursive tradition.
3. The Irrelevance of Efficacy
Among the most striking aspects of the push for suspicionless drug testing, and
a telling indication that it has little to do with ordinary public policy concerns, is its
inefficacy in achieving any ofthe purported objectives associated with the procedure.
Drug testing is variously touted as a means of encouraging welfare recipients to
overcome substance abuse as a barrier to employment, 234 stopping drug-related child
abuse, 235 and removing government from the business of subsidizing drug addiction.23 6
All of these objectives rest, in part, on the unfounded premise that drug abuse is a significantly greater concern among the poor than in the general population.237 Putting
aside that assumption, however, the use ofpunitive drug testing to address issues surrounding drug abuse is a highly overinclusive and ineffective means of accomplishing
any of the declared policy goals.
First, a positive drug test reflects only recent drug use, not drug abuse or impairment, and is accordingly an overinclusive means of identifying drug-related dysfunction.238 Thus, "[ilf drug testing is used as a form of screening, many recipients likely
to test positive will be casual drug users who do not satisfy diagnostic criteria for
See Pamela D. Bridgewater, Reproductive Freedomas Civil Freedom:The Thirteenth
Amendment's Role in the Strugglefor ReproductiveRights, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401,
231

404-08 (2000); Williams, supra note 228, at 720.
232 Smith, supra note 230, at 163; see Lynn M. Paltrow, Why CaringCommunities Must
Oppose C.R.A. C.KIProjectPrevention:How C.R.A.C.K PromotesDangerousPropaganda
and Underminesthe Healthand Well Being ofChildrenandFamilies,5 J.L. Soc'Y 11, 11-12,

93 (2003) (describing program that "offers $200 for current and former drug users to get sterilized or to use certain long-acting birth control methods").
233 Lucie White, Searchingforthe Logic Behind Welfare Reform, 6 UCLA WOMEN's L.J.
427, 433-34 (1996).
234 See, e.g., Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134,1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), af'd
by an equally divided court, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
235 Id. at 1141.
236 See, e.g., supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text; infra notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
237 See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text.
238 See, e.g., Pollack et al., supra note 219, at 269.
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dependence."23 9 Because "[w]idespread drug testing of welfare recipients will detect
use among many women who have no accompanying problem with impaired social
performance or employment,"240 it will inevitably sanction individuals for whom the
state has no cause for concern with respect to its stated objectives.
Second, drug abuse itself is not a significant contributing factor to welfare dependency. "Although [welfare] recipients have become more disadvantaged along
a number of characteristics related to health and mental health, substance abuse and
dependence is not a major contributor in defining the core group of recipients remaining on the rolls."24' As noted above, the incidence of drug abuse among welfare
recipients is estimated to be no higher than four percent of the entire beneficiary population.242 Ifall illicit drug use were completely eliminated among recipients, the number
of individuals in need of public assistance would decline by no more than three to
five percent.243
Finally, current drug testing methods are poorly designed to detect the types of
illicit drug use that are most likely to impair the lives of welfare recipients. Because
drugs such as heroin and cocaine are metabolized quickly, their use is undetectable
within a few days of ingestion. 2 4 By contrast, marijuana use is detectable for a much
longer period of time due to the fact that metabolites of the drug are fat soluble and thus
are retained in body tissue. 245 The use of marijuana, however, has a less statistically
significant association with welfare receipt than even tobacco.246 Conversely, welfare
receipt is most powerfully associated with cocaine, a drug that current testing methods
regularly fail to detect.2 47 Compounding the poor fit is the exclusion of alcohol from
federally authorized drug testing,248 despite the fact that it is by far the most widely
abused drug among the recipient population.249
Summarizing these efficacy considerations, researchers from the University of
Michigan reached the following conclusions:
239

240

id
Rukmalie Jayakody et al., Welfare Reform, Substance Abuse, and Mental Health, 25

J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 623, 644 (2000); see also SUSAN BOYD, MOTHERS AND ILLICIT
DRUGS: TRANSCENDING THE MYTHS 14-15 (1999).
241 JAYAKODY ET AL.,
242
243

supra note 213, at 3.
See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
Pollack, supra note 219, at 261.

Richard Hawks & C. Nora Chiang, Examples ofSpecificDrugAssays,in URINE TESTING
FOR DRUGS OF ABUSE 84-112 (Nat'l Inst. on Drug Abuse, Research Monograph Series No.
24

73, 1987).
Id.; see LYNN ZIMMER & JOHN MORGAN, MARIJUANA MYTHS, MARIJUANA FACTS: A
REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 121-22 (1997).
245

246
247

248
249

Pollack, supra note 219, at 261-62.
Id. at 262.
21 U.S.C. § 862(b) (2006) (authorizing testing for "controlled substance[s]").

Bridget F. Grant &Deborah A. Dawson,AlcoholandDrugUse, Abuse, andDependence

Among Welfare Recipients, 86 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1450, 1451-53 (1996).

2011]

PLEDGE YOUR BODY FOR YOUR BREAD

781

Most recipients likely to test positive are casual marijuana users
who do not satisfy DSM Il-R criteria for drug-dependence. Moreover, the benefits of drug testing must be weighed against the potential misallocation of resources if positive results divert scarce
treatment slots to occasional users.... Suspicionless, populationbased chemical testing of welfare recipients will detect some "true
positives" who are drug-dependent, a greater number of"accidental
positives" with complex psychological problems, and a larger
group of "false positives" who have no apparent psychiatric (including drug-related) disorder.... [C]hemical testing [also] does
not detect the large group of "false negatives". . . who are alcoholdependent or who experience psychiatric disorders, but who do
not use illicit drugs.250
That Congress pressed ahead with the authorization of punitive drug testing in the face
of such serious efficacy concerns lends considerable support to the suggestion that its
purpose had less to do with crafting coherent public policy than with the symbolic
affirmation of a politically expedient stereotype.
B. The InitialResponse of the States

Following passage of federal welfare reform and its invitation to the states to
impose suspicionless drug testing on welfare recipients, several states responded by
adopting more limited programs that sought to avoid the most serious constitutional
concerns associated with mandatory testing.25 ' Many of these ongoing programs
apply only to convicted drug felons or other individuals for whom the state has some
individualized reason to suspect drug abuse.252 Other programs apply generally to
the applicant or recipient population but rely on noninvasive screening assessments
to identify individuals for whom there is reasonable suspicion to support more invasive
drug testing.253 The State of Idaho, for example, "requires substance abuse testing of
2s0

Harold A. Pollack et al., Drug Testing Welfare Recipients-FalsePositives,FalseNega-

tives, UnanticipatedOpportunities,12 WOMEN'S HEALTH ISSUES 23, 29-30 (2002).
2s' This is not to suggest that the adopted measures are unobjectionable. To the contrary,

theyraise serious legal and policy questions. See, e.g., DeborahN. Archer& Kele S. Williams,
Making America "The Land ofSecond Chances":RestoringSocioeconomic Rights for ExOffenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. &Soc. CHANGE 527 (2006); Gustafson, supranote 74, at 672-74.

The focus here, however, is the particularly severe constitutional threat posed by suspicionless
drug testing.
252 See, e.g., 2009 Ariz. Sess. Laws 3rd S.S., ch. 10, § 27; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 460:10
(2009); MINN. STAT. §609B.435 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 108A-29.1 (2009); VA. CODEANN.
§ 63.2-605 (West 2009); Wis. STAT. §§ 49.79(5), 49.148(4) (2009).
253 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 56-209j (2009); LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 67, § 1249(B)
(2009).
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any [welfare] applicant or recipient, if the [state] has a reasonable suspicion they are
engaged in, or at high risk of, substance abuse. Testing will be conducted if screening
and assessment give a reasonable suspicion the participant is engaged in substance
abuse." 254 These programs may exist independently of or in combination with other
measures that temporarily or permanently bar the provision of aid to individuals convicted of certain drug-related offenses, as authorized by a separate provision of the
1996 federal statute.255
In contrast to this more limited approach, Michigan embraced the federal invitation
and enacted legislation in 1999 to impose suspicionless drug testing as a blanket condition of state aid.256 Michigan's statute called for the establishment of a pilot program
in at least three counties as a prelude to statewide testing within the following four
years. 257 The program required all new applicants to submit to a drug test and additionally mandated that twenty percent ofexisting recipients would be randomly tested
every six months.25 The statute directed that any individual testing positive would
participate in a substance-abuse treatment program259 and that noncompliance could
trigger the termination of aid.260 In the brief period that the program operated prior to
being enjoined by a federal court,261 the state tested 258 welfare applicants of whom
only twenty-one tested positive for illicit drug use.262 Consistent with the efficacy
considerations discussed above, all but three of those positive test results were for
marijuana use alone.263
As discussed in detail in Part II.D, below, the pilot program was challenged immediately and struck down by a district judge, who was then reversed by a three-judge
panel of the Sixth Circuit.2' The full circuit subsequently reheard the matter en banc
and upheld the district court by an equally divided vote.265 The constitutional question
was thus left entirely unresolved, and the resulting ambiguity has opened the door for
254
255

IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.16.03.08.120 (2009).
21 U.S.C. § 862a(a);see, e.g., KAN. STAT.ANN.

§ 39-709e (2009); LA.REv. STAT.ANN.

§ 46:233.2 (2009).
256
257
258

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571 (2009).

Id. § 400.571(2).
See Gustafson, supra note 74, at 679.

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.571(3) (2009).
Id; see Michael D. Socha, An Analysis ofMichigan'sPlanforSuspicionlessDrug Testing
of Welfare Recipients Underthe FourthAmendment "SpecialNeeds "Exception, 47 WAYNE
259
260

L. REv. 1099, 1101-02 (2001).
261 See infra Part II.D.2.
262 Lisa R.Metch &Harold A. Pollack, WelfareReform andSubstanceAbuse,83 MILBANK
Q. 65, 76 (2005).
263 Id

Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd,309 F.3d 330
2"
(6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,judgment vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en
banc), aff'd by an equally divided court, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
265 Id
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other states to reconsider more aggressive drug testing proposals. 26 6 Scores of such
proposals have appeared over the last three years,267 suggesting that the enactment and
implementation of another blanket testing program is a genuine threat.
C. The Legislative Groundswell

A recent survey of state legislative activity over the last three years reveals very
substantial renewed interest in aggressive drug testing of welfare applicants and recipients. Since 2007, lawmakers in at least thirty states and the District of Columbia
have proposed over sixty bills to impose testing requirements as a condition of eligibility for public assistance.268 With limited exception, this body of legislation provides
broadly for ongoing suspicionless testing and embraces the entire population ofpublic
aid beneficiaries, but omits any privacy protections or procedural safeguards. 269 Notably, the number of aggressive drug testing bills has climbed each of the last three
2 71
years,270 corresponding with the onset of the recent financial crisiS and consistent
with the thesis that public policy grows increasingly punitive towards the poor during
periods of economic hardship.27 2 Whatever the cause may be, this legislative groundswell has quickly emerged as an important development with serious implications for
the Fourth Amendment privacy rights of the poor.
Consistent with the legislative history of the authorizing federal statute, recent
state efforts reflect a caricaturized conception of welfare recipients 273 and make no
effort to grapple with data suggesting that drug dependence among the poor is not a
significantly greater concern than it is among the general population. 274 The political
rhetoric thus depicts recipients as addicts and criminals, the welfare system as a counterproductive enabler of addiction, and drug abuse as a moral failing that drives families
into poverty. 7 A state senator from Arizona captured these themes in his recent defense of a drug testing bill:
There's a moral issue here.... If you're getting taxpayer benefits,
and this isn't money you've earned, you're getting free stuff....
266
267
268
269
270

See, e.g., Greenblatt,supra note 22.
See infra note 284.
See infra Part II.C.1.
See infra Part II.C.1 & II.C.2.
See infra note 284.

MARTINNEAL BAILY & DOUGLAS J. ELLIOTT, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE U.S. FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS: WHERE DOES IT STAND AND WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
3-5 (2009), availableathttp://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/0615_economic

2

crisis bailyelliott/0615_economic crisis baily elliott.pdf.
See, e.g., Clark Allen Peterson, The Resurgence ofDurationalResidenceRequirements
for the Receipt of Welfare Funds, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 305, 334 n.195 (1993).
273 See infra notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
272

274
275

See supranote 212 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 276-83 and accompanying text.
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The minimum ought to be that you ought to not be somebody's
[sic] that's engaged in criminal activity.... A lot of the folks that
are in desperate need are (that way) because they have a substance
abuse problem.... So I'm hoping that this will drive them to get
help or at least protect the taxpayer from funding folks who need
to get their act together.276
Other state legislators describe drug testing proposals as an effort to "provide[] these
drug-addicted welfare recipients with the wake-up call they need," 27 7 to change "the
status quo system that enables drug addicts with taxpayer money," 2 78 "to prevent the
state ... from becoming an enabler to addiction," 279 to assure that "taxpayers [do] not
have to subsidize drug abuse," 2 80 and to "protect[] our tax dollars from fueling drug
addictions." 281' The theme of moral failing pervades the debate: "individuals who continue to use drugs are unable to provide for their families and end up on public assistance,"282 and, once there, "[t]oo often . . . take advantage of our public assistance
program and try to pocket or use their extra funds to purchase items they're not suppose
to such as drugs." 283 Against this backdrop of moral condemnation, the rising tide of
drug testing proposals is predictably severe.
1. The Elimination of Individualized Suspicion
The most significant attribute ofrecent legislative proposals is the overwhelming
absence ofany requirement that individualized suspicion support invasive drug testing.
Suspicionless testing is thus a condition of aid embraced by forty-nine bills introduced
Drug Testfor Arizona Welfare Recipients May Be Needed, DOUGLAS DISPATCH, Feb.
2, 2009, http://www.douglasdispatch.com/articles/2009/02/02/news/doc4987b79c7878776
276

7632585.txt (quoting Ariz. State Sen. Russell Pearce).
277

Party-LinersAgain Reject CompassionateReforms of Welfare System, CAL. CHRONICLE,

Apr. 29,2009, http://www.califomiachronicle.com/articles/view/l00510 (quoting Cal. State
Sen. John Benoit).
278
279

id
Juana Summers, MissouriHouseApproves DrugTesting Welfare Recipients,But Proposal

Shows Trouble in Senate, ST. Louis TODAY, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.stltoday.com/news

/local/govt-and-politics/political-fix/article_1 2c95ddd-654b-56ed-943a- 169704da04a6.html
(quoting Mo. State Sen. Gary Nodler).
280 Marshall Griffin, Missouri House Passes Bill to Require Drug Testing for Welfare
Recipients, ST. Louis PUB. RADIO NEWS, Feb. 11, 2010, http://www.publicbroadcasting.net

/kwmu/news.newsmain/article/0/0/16113 54/St.Louis.Public.Radio.News/Mo. House
.passes.drug.testing.bill (quoting Mo. State Rep. Ellen Brandom).
281

Lawmaker Introduces Bill to Require Drug Testsfor Public Assistance, CBS

NEWS

(Apr. 1,2009), http://www.wrdw.com/home/headlines/42272572.html (quoting S.C.
State Rep. Rex Rice).
282 Press Release, Okla. State Senate, Senate Approves Measure Linking Drug Testing to
Welfare Eligibility (Feb.25, 2009), availableat http://www.oksenate.gov/news/press-releases
/pressreleases_2009/pr20090225c.html.
283 NY Spons. Memo., Assemb. 3602, 23 1st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009).
AUGUSTA
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in twenty-seven legislatures since 2007,28' accounting for eighty percent of the identified drug testing legislation over the last three years. Ten legislatures- those of
Arkansas, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, and Tennessee-have each produced multiple bills providing for suspicionless testing,285 while seventeen others have each produced one such bill.286 By
contrast, only thirteen bills from seven states and the District of Columbia follow the
lead of earlier programs and limit invasive testing to circumstances supported byprobable cause or reasonable suspicion,28 7 often established by a preliminary noninvasive
assessment of the entire applicant or recipient population.288
284 H.R. 2678,48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281,87th Gen.
Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 384, 2009-2010
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389,2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 3184,24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452,96th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill.
2009); H.R. 389,96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (111. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268,
116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., Ist Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Kan. 2009); H.R. 221,2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190,2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R.
137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300,425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580,
94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 3698,86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982,
85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647,
124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320,124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419,
123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S.
178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., IstReg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 5 1st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2008); S. 606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa.
2009); H.R. 1597,2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731,
105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess
(Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
285 See supra note
284.
286 See id.(Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, Wyoming).
287 S. 1026 sec. 27,49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); Council 661, 17th Council Period
(D.C. 2008); S. 1189,25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); H.R. 949,95th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg.
Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen.
Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330,94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008);
S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868, 49th Leg., Ist Sess. (N.M.
2009); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008);
H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
288 See, e.g., Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va.
2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).
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Suspicionless testing under these bills takes one of two forms-it is either imposed
on an entire class of applicants or recipients or it is applied randomly to some subset of
the target population. In this regard, thirty-one bills in nineteen states impose invasive
testing upon their entire target population,289 while seventeen bills in ten legislatures
impose testing on randomly selected individuals.290 Two bills combine these methods
by testing the entire population of applicants while randomly testing some subset ofthe
larger class of current recipients.29 1
2. The Attributes of Testing: Breadth, Process, and Consequences
The surveyed legislation varies to some extent regarding the breadth of the population subject to drug testing, the steps taken to protect procedural integrity and personal
privacy, and the consequences of a positive test result. On balance, a substantial majority of the proposed bills apply to the broadest possible target population, provide
very few, if any, privacy or procedural protections, and impose the harshest possible
sanction for a positive drug test.
With respect to the breadth of the subject population, drug testing may target aid
applicants, current recipients, or both. Among the sixty-two identified bills introduced
H.R. 2678,48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (111. 2009); H.R.
389,96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (111. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009);
H.R. 221,2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190,2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 137, 35th
Reg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.D. 1300,425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R. 6580,94th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 1982,85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); Assemb. 3602,231st
Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S.941, 2009 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg.,
IstReg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S.769, 52d Leg., 1stReg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S.390, 52d Leg., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130,51st Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S.606,74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S.832,20092010 Reg. Sess (Pa. 2009); H.R. 1597, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 2648, 105th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S.2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb.,
Ist Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg.,
Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
290 S. 384, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389,2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008); S. 3184, 24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008); H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg.
Sess. (1ll. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind.
2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb.,
Ist Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 916, 124th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S.2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C.
2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.Va. 2009).
291 S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., Ist Sess. (Iowa 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2008).
289
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since 2007, over half-thirty-five-reach both categories.2 92 Of the remaining bills,
sixteen apply to recipients alone 293 while eleven are limited to applicants for assistance. 29 4 There are a few notable outliers. Two Mississippi bills from 2009 expand the
subject population to include children as young as thirteen years old.295 In an egalitarian
nod, two bills require drug testing not only of applicants and recipients but also of all
candidates for the Illinois state legislature296 and all sitting members of the Missouri
General Assembly.297
S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); H.R. 2678, 48th Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Ariz. 2008); H.R. 1281, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); S. 216, 87th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2009); H.R. 2252,96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (111. 2009); H.R.
389, 96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008);
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R.
190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982,
85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2007); H.R. 949,95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009);
S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868,49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 769, 52d
Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S. 390, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d
Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513,
51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S.
606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); S. 832,2009-2010 Reg. Sess (Pa. 2009); H.R.
1597, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., 1stReg. Sess.
(S.C. 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W.
Va. 2009).
293 S. 384,2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2008); S. 1189,25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184,24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2008);
H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess.(Kan. 2009); H.R. 137, 35thReg. Sess. (La. 2009); H.R. 6580,
94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647,
124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419,
123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2008); H.R. 2342,94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008);
S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
294 Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ga. 2007); H.R. 4452,96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300,425th Sess.
Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); Assemb. 3602,231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S. 941, 2009 Reg.
Sess. (N.C. 2009); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008);
S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007).
295 H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009).
296 H.R. 4452, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2009).
297 H.R. 2342, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008).
292
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The testing itself requires the extraction and collection of bodily fluids and tissues
including blood,298 "urine, hair, saliva, sweat, or whatever [other] specimen proves to
be the most cost-effective." 299 Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority ofthe surveyed
legislation makes no mention of privacy protections for individuals facing such intimately invasive procedures.30 Only two bills specifically provide for the collection of
samples with "due regard to the privacy of the individual" and "in a manner reasonably
calculated to prevent substitutions or interference""o' with the collected material.
With respect to the use and distribution of test results, the legislation likewise
imposes few restrictions.302 A handful of bills require that results be maintained in
confidence, with no public disclosure except by consent ofthe person tested or pursuant
to a judicial order.303 Three other bills specify that positive test results may not be used
in criminal proceedings."* Only one bill combines these protections of confidentiality
and immunity from prosecution.305 Similarly, the vast majority of legislation offers no
procedural safeguards with regard to the testing process. 306 Bills proposed in Indiana,307
Missouri,30 and Tennessee309 provide for a hearing or other appeal of a positive test
result, while a few others require specific notice prior to actual testing.3"0 Bills in
Illinois, 311Indiana 3 12 and Tennessee3 13 provide for the retesting of samples to rule out
298
299

H.R. 868, 49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009).
H.R. 137, 35th Reg. Sess. (La. 2009).

" See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); see S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess.
(Iowa 2009).
302 See generally, supra notes 284,
287.
301

303

S. 268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,

Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); S. 1513, 51st Leg.,
2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); H.R. 3007, 79th Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009).
'
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221,2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008);
H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
305 S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., Ist Sess. (Iowa
2009).
306 See generally, supra notes 284, 287.
307

H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen.

Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
308 H.R. 949,95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330,94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
309 H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
310 H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008).
" H.R. 4452,96th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252,96th Gen. Assemb.,
Ist Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009).
312 H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008).
3
H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
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false positives. Also to rule out false positives, a handful of bills allow individuals to
submit additional medical information that may provide an alternative explanation for
positive test results.3 14 Notwithstanding these provisions, fully two-thirds of the recent
legislation contains no privacy or procedural protections whatsoever."'
Finally, a substantial majority ofthe bills impose the harshest possible consequence
for a positive test result. Over two-thirds of the identified legislation, from twenty-one
states, mandates the immediate termination or denial of benefits as the sanction for a
positive test.3 1 1 Of these bills, several deny aid without specifying when, if ever, benefits might resume."' Others permit individuals to reapply for assistance after some prescribed period of ineligibility.' Among the bills requiring the denial or termination of
S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Iowa 2009); S.268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg.
Sess. (Ind. 2009).
314

3

See supra notes 284, 287.

S. 1026 sec. 27,49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S.268, 149th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 1189,25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184,24th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Haw. 2008); H.R. 2252,96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 389, 96th Gen.
Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 1186, 116th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009);
S. 268, 116th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 1339, 115th Gen. Assemb., 2d
316

Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2008); S.232, 83d Gen. Assemb., Ist Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 221,2008 Reg.

Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 190,2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580,94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich.
2008); H.R. 3698, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H.R. 1982, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2007); H.R. 916,124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S.2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2008); H.R. 949,95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183,95th Gen. Assemb., Ist
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 73, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330,94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); S. 178,128th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S.769, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S.614, 75th Legis. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); S. 832, 2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R. 2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn.
2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 102, 105th Gen. Assemb.,
Ist Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R. 588, 105th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2007); H.R.
830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.D. 3007, 79th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2009); S. 91, 59th Leg., Budget Sess. (Wyo. 2008).
317 See, e.g., S. 1189,25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S. 3184,24th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
2008); H.R. 389,96th Gen. Assem., Ist Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 221, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky.
2008); H.R. 190,2008 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2008); H.R. 6580,94th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2008);
H.R. 1939, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1649, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla.
2009); S. 769, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); H.R. 1407, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Okla. 2009); H.R. 3130, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 614, 75th Leg. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); H.R. 3829, 118th Sess. Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2009); H.R.
2648, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2008); S. 2731, 105th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2008).
See, e.g., S. 1026 sec. 27, 49th Leg., 3d Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 2009); S. 268, 149th Gen.
3'
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2007); S. 232, 83d Gen. Assemb., Ist Sess. (Iowa 2009); H.R. 4452,
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aid to a primary beneficiary, a few provide that aid to dependents may continue through
disbursements to a third-party payee.3 19 By contrast, only seventeen bills allow benefits
to be paid to an individual who tests positive for illicit drug use, typically on condition
that the recipient participate in a drug rehabilitation treatment program.320
Across the identified legislation, the most common provisions are invariably the
harshest. The typical bill applies without suspicion to the entire class of welfare applicants and recipients, makes no provision for the protection of either the individual's
privacy during the testing process or the security of test results, affords no procedural recourse for individuals testing positive, and mandates the immediate denial
of aid to anyone identified as having used an illicit drug. While it is impossible to predict whether such legislation ultimately will be enacted, the character and intensity of
legislative activity over the last three years suggests that the possibility is significant.
D. Two Visions of a ConstitutionalResponse

The enactment of suspicionless drug testing legislation will force the federal courts
to answer, finally, the constitutional question left open by the Michigan litigation.321
In assessing how the courts might approach the issue, the Michigan decisions are
highly instructive. The district court in Marchwinski considered the issue within the
conventional parameters of the Fourth Amendment and reached the straightforward
conclusion that the state's blanket drug testing proposal was impermissible.322 On
96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.R. 2252, 96th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess.
(111. 2009); H.R. 916, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S. 2647, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2009); H.R. 320, 124th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2009); S.2419, 123d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss.
2008); H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., Ist
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S.73,95th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); H.R. 2330,94th
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); S. 1259, 94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo.
2008); S. 1513, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2008); S. 178, 128th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Ohio 2009); H.R. 830, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009); H.R. 3007,79th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(W. Va. 2009).
H.R. 949, 95th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 183, 95th Gen. Assemb., 1st
3'
Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S.73, 95th Gen. Assemb., Ist Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2009); S. 1259, 94th Gen.
Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.D. 365, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008).
320 H.R. 2678,48th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2008); S.216, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ark. 2009); S. 384,2009-2010 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2009); Assemb. 2389,2007-2008 Reg. Sess.
(Cal. 2008); Council 661, 17th Council Period (D.C. 2008); H.R. 1717, 116th Gen. Assemb.,
IstReg. Sess. (Ind. 2009); H.R. 2275, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2009); H.R. 4452,96th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009); H.D. 1300, 425th Sess. Gen. Assemb. (Md. 2008); H.R.
2342,94th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.R. 868,49th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2009);
Assemb. 3602, 231st Legis. Sess. (N.Y. 2009); S.390, 52d Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2009); S.
606, 74th Legis. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); H.R. 1597, 2007-2008 Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2007);
S. 404, 2008 Reg. Sess. (Va. 2008); H.R. 3209, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
321 See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
322 Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (E.D. Mich. 2000), rev'd, 309 F.3d 330
(6th Cir. 2002), reh'gen bancgrantedjudgmentvacated,319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003), aff'dby

an equally divided court, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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appeal, a panel ofthe Sixth Circuit reversed based on an entirely different, ifunstated,
premise-that the poor constitute a subconstitutional class for purposes ofthe privacy
right and thus fall beyond the protections of conventional doctrine.323 These irreconcilable approaches perfectly mirror the parallel controversy, discussed above, over the
application of the Fourth Amendment's privacy right to the homes of welfare recipients.324 If the federal courts are asked again to consider the question in the context of
suspicionless drug testing, the divergent outcomes in the Michigan litigation will frame
for the judiciary an unambiguous choice.
1. Bodily Privacy: A Preface
At the core of the Fourth Amendment is "the individual's legitimate expectations
that in certain places and at certain times he has 'the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men. "'325 When the
state seeks to intrude upon the body, it implicates the "most personal and deep-rooted
expectations of privacy" grounded in the "moral fact that a person belongs to himself
and not others nor to society as a whole." 327 These deeply invested expectations trigger,
in turn, "the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches
of one's person. "328
The Fourth Amendment traditionally guards this private sphere through the dual
requirements of probable cause and a warrant. As the Court noted in Schmerber v.
California,both requirements apply with considerable force in the context of intrusions
upon the body. 329 As to cause, the Schmerber Court noted:
The interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth
Amendment protects forbid any such intrusions [beyond the
323

309 F.3d 330.

324
32S

See supra Part I.B.2.

326

Id. at 760.

Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753,758 (1985) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
Thomburgh v. Am. Coll. ofObstetricians &Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,777 n.5 (1986)
(Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence,6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 288
(1977)).
328 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999). The highly protected status of the
body is recognized across other constitutional doctrines as well, most notably as a component
of liberty and privacy under the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S.
127, 135 (1992); Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79
(1990); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210,221-22,229 (1990); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172-74 (1952); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.Williamson, 316 U.S. 535,541 (1942);
327

see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) ("[Roe v. Wade] ...

may be seen ... as a rule ... ofpersonal autonomy and bodily integrity, with doctrinal affinity
to cases recognizing limits on governmental power to mandate medical treatment or to bar
its rejection.").
329 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966).
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body's surface] on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained. In the absence of a clear indication that in fact such evidence will be found, these fundamental human interests require law
officers to suffer the risk that such evidence may disappear unless
there is an immediate search.330
The requirement ofjudicial review plays an equally important role, as the Court also
underscored in Schmerber:
Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of dwellings,
and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned.... The importance of
informed, detached and deliberate determinations of the issue
whether or not to invade another's body in search of evidence of
guilt is indisputable and great."'
While these requirements obviously do not prohibit a search of the body, they provide
a significant constraint "against intrusions which are notjustified in the circumstances,
or which are made in an improper manner." 332
In applying these principles, the Court has required that probable cause support the
extraction ofblood from a drunk-driving suspect,333 barred suspicionless drug testing
ofmaternity patients for purposes of identifying child-abuse suspects,334 and prohibited
the extraction of a bullet from a suspect's body even in the presence of probable cause,
given the gravity of the intrusion." Prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court similarly restricted the search of a suspect's stomach under the Due
Process Clause 336 and more recently has underscored the significant liberty interest
implicated when the state seeks to forcibly inject medication into a nonconsenting
person's body. 33 7 As these cases intuitively confirm, "The integrity of an individual's
person is a cherished value of our society"338 and triggers "the greatest Fourth Amendment protection." 3
Outside the context of criminal law enforcement, the Court has relaxed the requirements of the Warrant Clause in certain circumstances to permit the state to conduct
330

31
332
3

33
3
336
3
3
3

Id.
Id. at 770.
Id. at 768.
Id. at 770.

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84-86 (2001).
Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 766-67 (1985).
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22, 229 (1990).
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 54 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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otherwise impermissible body searches for civil or administrative purposes.34 0 The
authority that embraces these circumstances-the special-needs doctrine34 -bears
directly on the permissibility of recent drug testing proposals insofar as the searches at
issue rest on neither cause nor a warrant. Under the doctrine, the Court engages in a
two-step analysis considering, first, whether the proposed search advances a "special
need" of the state, and, if so, whether the search strikes a reasonable balance between
individual privacy interests and the strength ofthe countervailing government objective.342 The doctrine has been used primarily to justify targeted drug testing programs343
but has been applied in other contexts as well-for example, to sustain a warrantless
home search conducted as a condition of probation.3"
The first and central inquiry under the doctrine is whether the state's special need
is sufficiently compelling to suspend otherwise applicable constitutional restrictions.34
In the absence of a special need, the analysis goes no further.346 While the need must
be unrelated to the ordinary demands of criminal law enforcement,347 a civil or administrative objective is not sufficient, standing alone, to satisfy the doctrine. In addition,
the need "must be substantial-important enough to override the individual's acknowledged privacy interest, sufficiently vital to suppress the Fourth Amendment's normal
requirement ofindividualized suspicion."348 Although the formulation is highly indeterminate,349 the practical application ofthe doctrine has typically involved one oftwo
permissible objectives: the promotion ofpublic safety and the related protection of the
health and security of schoolchildren under the state's in locoparentiscontrol. 350 Regarding the first rationale, the Court has stated that "where. ..public safety is not genuinely injeopardy, the Fourth Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter
how conveniently arranged.""' Regarding the second, the Court has "caution[ed]
against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional
340

See infra notes 345-52 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
See, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechs. v. City of Albuquerque, 156 F.3d 1068, 1072
(10th Cir. 1998).
343 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton,
515 U.S. 646 (1995); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner,
341

342

489 U.S. 602.
34

345
346

347
348

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
See, e.g., 19 Solid Waste Dep't Mechs., 156 F.3d at 1072.
Id
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66.

Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 318 (1997).

349 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Is Obtainingan Arrestee'sDNA a ValidSpecialNeeds Search
Underthe FourthAmendment? What Should (andWill) the Supreme CourtDo?,34 J.L. MED.
& ETHics 165, 170 (2006); William J. Stuntz,Implicit Bargains,GovernmentPower,andthe
FourthAmendment, 44 STAN. L. REv. 553, 554 (1992).
350 See Budd, supra note 10, at 397-98; cf Chandler,520 U.S. at 309.
31
Chandler,520 U.S. at 323;see, e.g., Bd. ofEduc. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822,836-37 (2002).
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muster in other contexts. The most significant element in this case is .. .that the Policy
was undertaken in furtherance of the government's responsibilities, under a public
school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its care." 35 2
There is considerable speculation about how far these two categories reach.353
While the Court has underscored in recent opinions that special needs constitute a
"closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,"354
the decisional law demonstrates that the doctrine may be employed to permit suspicionless body searches in circumstances that only tenuously relate to the sanctioned
rationales.355 Regardless ofhow distant the two categories may extend, however, they
cannot rationally stretch so far as to justify suspicionless drug testing of the entire population of welfare applicants and recipients-for whom the state has neither in loco
parentisresponsibility nor any encompassing public-safety concern.35 ' The constitutionality of such proposals is accordingly highly doubtful under conventional doctrine,
as Wayne LaFave and others have observed.35
2. Principled Adjudication
Accepting this conventional account of the Fourth Amendment, the district court
in the Michigan litigation concluded that the challenged testing program failed to
advance any recognized special need and was thus impermissible.3 8" The district
court first noted that the declared purpose ofthe authorizing federal statute was to move
welfare recipients to work, and that the state's drug testing program rested on the
complementary objective of "address[ing] substance abuse as a barrier to employment." 359 Since neither goal touched remotely on a public safety concern, the
district court concluded that the testing program was irreconcilable with the Supreme Court's specification of permissible special needs. 6 o
352

Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995).

353 See, e.g., supra note 349; cf Fabio Arcila, Jr., SpecialNeeds andSpecial Deference:
Suspicionless Civil Searches in the Modem Regulatory State, 56 ADMIN. L. REv. 1223,

1231-34 (2004).
354 Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309; Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).
355 See, e.g., Aubreyv. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998) (upholding
suspicionless drug testing of school janitors on grounds that they hold safety-sensitive positions
and work closely with children).
356 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ETAL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §3.9(d) (3d ed. 2007) ("While
federal legislation authorizes states to undertake suspicionless drug testing of welfare recipients,
such action is not justified by ... the Supreme Court's drug testing decisions."); see, e.g.,
Corinne A. Carey, Craftinga Challenge to the PracticeofDrug Testing Welfare Recipients:
FederalWelfare Reform and State Response as the Most Recent Chapterin the War on Drugs,
46 BUFF. L. REV. 281 (1998); Socha, supra note 260, at 1118-19.
357

Id.

.. Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1139-40 (E.D. Mich. 2000), af'dby an
equally divided court, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
310

Id. at 1140.

360

id
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The State nevertheless proposed that it sought to protect recipients' children
from drug-related child abuse and thus pursued a safety-related objective as well."'
After noting the post hoc nature of the rationale,362 the district court addressed its
implications:
[This] excuse could be used for testing the parents of all children
who receive Medicaid, State Emergency Relief, educational grants
or loans, public education or any other benefit from the State. In
all cases in which the State offers a benefit on behalf of minor
children, the State could claim that it has a broad interest in the
care of those children which overcomes the privacy rights of the
parents. . . . "Such a categorical approach to an entire class of
citizens would be dangerously at odds with the tenets of our
democracy."363
To the district court's rejoinder might be added the fact that welfare recipients abuse
3
thus, that the state has no
drugs at no greater rate than the general population "-and,
greater interest in stopping drug-related child abuse among welfare recipients than it
has with respect to the vast majority ofother parents who receive some tax deduction,
credit, or similar subsidy on behalf of dependent children. 6 Michigan's child-safety
rationale would thus eviscerate the Fourth Amendment's requirement ofindividualized
suspicion across the spectrum of American families-a result that is neither politically
nor doctrinally tenable.*
The court turned next to Michigan's separate contention that its drug testing
scheme was authorized by the Supreme Court's decision in Wyman v. James, which
upheld mandatory home visits by welfare caseworkers. 6 ' The district court dismissed
the argument on two grounds. First, as the district court noted, Wyman held that the
home visits at issue did not even constitute a Fourth Amendment search and authorized
the entries, in part, on that basis. 6 Since it is indisputable that invasive drug testing is
161
362

Id. at 1141.
Id. at 1141-42.

Id. at 1142 (quoting Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309,342 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
" See supra note 212 and accompanying text.

363

361

See, e.g., Alan Berube, IndividualIncome Tax Creditsas SocialPolicy in RuralAmerica,

POVERTY L. & POL'Y 151, 155-59 (2006).
Cf City oflndianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32,42 (2000). Outside the context ofwelfare, at least one other court has rejected a suspicionless drug testing proposal on grounds that
parents have no diminished expectation ofprivacy simply by virtue ofthe state's general interest
in the well-being oftheir children. See State v. Moreno, 203 P.3d 1000, 1008-12 (Utah 2009)
(barring drug testing of the parents of delinquent minors for purposes of assuring that they
set a good example for their children).
36
400 U.S. 309 (1971); see Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43.

13 GEO. J. ON
366

368

Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317; supra notes

106-09 and accompanying text.
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a search within the scope ofthe Fourth Amendment, the Wyman analysis is obviously
irrelevant in that respect.369
Michigan argued, however, that Wyman's alternative holding-that the home visits
constituted a reasonable entry under the Fourth Amendment 3 o-supported its testing
program by establishing that welfare applicants have a generally diminished expectation
ofprivacy as a result of their voluntary request for assistance."' The district court rejected the argument in light of the conflicting analysis in Chandlerv. Miller,which
struck down a suspicionless drug testing program directed at candidates for public
office.372 As the court noted, the act of seeking elected office is considerably more voluntary than submitting an application for public assistance, which typically reflects
some measure ofeconomic coercion.3 73 Nevertheless, the ChandlerCourt recognized
that candidates for political office possess a legitimate and defensible expectation of
privacy irrespective of the highly consensual nature of the activity at issue.374 Necessarily, then, welfare recipients must possess an equally defensible privacy expectation
in the substantially less voluntary context within which they interact with the state."
Finally, the district court noted that Wyman predates the Supreme Court's special-needs
jurisprudence and in particular the requirement articulated in Chandlerthat a safetyrelated justification support a special-needs search.7 6 "To the extent that Wyman could
be construed as allowing otherwise, its holding is no longer viable.""
Unable to identify either a special need or a credible basis to defer to the fading
authority of Wyman, the district court enjoined Michigan's testing program as a violation of the Fourth Amendment 7 s In view ofprevailing special needs authority, the
holding is a straightforward application of reasonably well-settled law.
3. Subconstitutional Adjudication
A three-judge panel of the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court in an opinion
rooted in an entirely different, and frankly biased, set of analytic assumptions.37 9 The
opinion proceeds squarely in the tradition of the bifurcated Fourth Amendment and
offers arguments and rationales that are impossible to reconcile with conventional
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1142-43.
See supra notes I10-13 and accompanying text.
' Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 324.

369

370

520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
374 Id.; see Chandler, 520 U.S. at 318.
3s Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
376 Id. at 1143; see Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323.
3" Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. 2d at 1143.
378 Id. at 1144; see also Drug Tests as a Condition ofReceiving Public Assistance, Op. Att'y
Gen. 07-84 (Tenn. 2007).
1'
Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'gen bancgrantedjudgment
vacated, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
372
3
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authority.3"o To make sense of the opinion, one must accept at the outset the premise
that the poor inhabit a different constitutional universe where their presumed culpability
justifies intrusions that are otherwise at odds with traditional doctrine. Throughout
the opinion, poverty is implicitly employed as a proxy for individualized suspicion as
the poor are cast as an inherently criminal, child-abusing, and drug addicted class.
The Sixth Circuit's decision begins with the state's asserted special need. To accommodate its substantive objectives, the court first refrained the governing standard
to drain the special-needs concept of virtually any limiting effect. Rejecting the pronouncement in Chandlerthat a permissible special need must be grounded in some
public safety concern,"' the court asserted instead that safety "is but one consideration"
and "need not predominate" in the special needs calculation.382 in support, the circuit
relied exclusively on BoardofEducationv. Earls,3 83 the Supreme Court's latest opinion
dealing with the other rationale for a special needs search-the state's in loco parentis
responsibility for schoolchildren under its care and supervision. 3 ' In Earls,the Court
upheld a school's suspicionless drug testing program for students involved in extracurricular activities on the expressly qualified basis that "Fourth Amendment rights ...
are different in public schools than elsewhere; the 'reasonableness' inquiry cannot disregard the schools' custodial and tutelary responsibility for children."" Moreover,
within that uniquely supervisory context, the Earls Court accepted as "correct" the
proposition that "safety factors into the special needs analysis" but concluded that
"the safety interest furthered by drug testing is undoubtedly substantial for all children"
in the setting of a public school.386 To derive from Earls that safety "need not predominate"3' in a special-needs analysis beyond the context ofpublic education-thus
trumping the express requirements of Chandler-isa "dubious conclusion"388 that
defies the terms of the opinion itself.
Having rewritten the constitutional standard to accommodate an open and undefined set of additional special needs, the Sixth Circuit proceeded to manufacture an
amalgam of rationales that bear no relation to any preceding authority and that render
the doctrine nearly limitless in its application to the general population. First, in a nod
to Chandler,the court embraced Michigan's post hoc safety rationale for drug testing
and asserted without analysis that the program was designed to protect children from
38o See, e.g., LAFAVE ET AL.,supra note 109, at § 10.3 ("[The opinion] misread Wyman and
reached the dubious conclusion thatEarls,the Supreme Court's latest school drug testing case,

trumped Chandlereven outside a public school context").
31 Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997).
382 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 335.
13

536 U.S. 822 (2002).

" Id.; see Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 334-35.
Earls, 536 U.S. at 829-30 (quoting Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
656 (1995)).
386 Id. at 836.
387 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d
at 335.
388 LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 10.3.
385
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drug-related abuse.' In doing so, the court ignored the fact that the authorizing federal
statute as well as Michigan's own policy rationale made no mention of child safety in
justifying the testing at issue,390 ignored empirical data refuting the premise that welfare
parents abuse drugs at a significantly greater rate than the general population,"' and
declined to acknowledge the necessary implication of its argument: that any parent
could henceforth be subject to suspicionless drug testing simply by accepting a childrelated state subsidy.392
Moving further beyond the record, the Sixth Circuit next imagined that the drug
testing program might advance an even broader public safety concem-"the risk to the
public from the crime associated with illicit drug use and trafficking."393 Reasoning
now in a factual vacuum, the court conjured the image of welfare-subsidized drug
dealers preying on a victimized public and declared that the threat constituted yet another safety-related special need supporting universal drug testing among welfare
recipients.3" The characterization, however, bears no relation to available data establishing that no more than one in five welfare recipients even uses an illicit drug in a
given year,"' that no more than four percent ofrecipients are addicted,396 and that less
than six percent of applicants and recipients in related aid programs have lost benefits
based on drug-related criminal activity.3 " The court's analysis at this juncture mirrors
rational-basis review in the context of equal protection, where any imaginable justification is sufficient to sustain the state's conduct irrespective of the record or the state's
actual objectives.9 Rational basis review is essentially synonymous with no review at
all,3' and its application in this context reduces the special-needs inquiry to pretense.'
39
390

Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336.
See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1140 (E.D. Mich. 2000), affd by an

equally divided court, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 363-66 and accompanying text.
393 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336.
394 id
3'9

392

' See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.

396
31

See, e.g., U.S. Gov'TACCOUNTABIUTY OFFICE, GAO-05-238, DRUG OFFENDERS: VARI-

ous

FACTORS MAY LIMIT THE IMPACTS OF FEDERAL LAWS THAT PROVIDE FOR DENIAL OF
SELECTED BENEFITS 13-15 (2005) (setting forth data from public housing programs).

See, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656,660 (1973); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
31 Id.; cf Loffredo, supra note 9, at 1283-84 ("Indeed, in the nearly twenty years that this
rule has been in effect, the Court has not invalidated a single poverty classification or social
welfare restriction.").
400 To the extent that the circuit's imagined crime-fighting rationale might envision testing as
a means of identifying specific criminal suspects, it would also run headlong into the first and
primary restriction placed on special-needs searches-that they be employed only for purposes
"divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement." Ferguson v. City ofCharleston,
398

532 U.S. 67,79(2001); Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656,665-66 (1989).
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Completing its reinvention of special needs, the court struck out beyond public
safety to declare yet another rationale for suspicionless searches-the state's pedestrian
interest in the fiscal integrity of its benefits program.40' The court asserted, without
citation to any authority, that it is true "beyond cavil that the state has a special need
to insure that public moneys expended in the [program] are used by the recipients for
their intended purposes and not for procuring controlled substances.. .. '2 Theimplications of this claim are most sweeping of all. Applicable to virtually any government
benefit, the rationale establishes that the simple receipt of a tax deduction, credit, or
subsidy empowers the state to conduct warrantless and suspicionless searches to verify
that the beneficiary does not use the funds to buy contraband. There is virtually no one
left who, in the wake of such reasoning, might remain protected from suspicionless
searches to advance the state's generalized interest in assuring that its ubiquitous
largesse is not diverted to the purchase of illicit drugs.403
Having devised an unprecedented set of special needs to justify Michigan's testing
program,4 04 the Sixth Circuit was obliged to proceed to the next step of the specialneeds inquiry and balance the strength of the government's rationale against the individual privacy interests at stake.405 Acknowledging that this inquiry required consideration of the efficacy of Michigan's search policy in meeting the government's asserted
goals,4 06 the Sixth Circuit declared that blanket drug testing was indeed an effective
method ofaddressing drug abuse-for the sole reason that Michigan's program applied
universally to the applicant and recipient population and thus assertedly would catch
all abusers in its net.407 As discussed above, however, blanket drug testing is actually
an ineffective method of identifying drug-related abuse and associated dysfunction.408
The overwhelming majority of positive drug tests will be for the casual use of marijuana, which implicates none of the state's purported concerns.409 Conversely, much
of the most serious drug abuse will avert detection due to the speed with which such
drugs are metabolized following ingestion. 410 Rather than an effective means of addressing the state's interest in drug-related abuse and crime, blanket drug testing of the
401 Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,
judgment vacated,319 F. 3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
402 Id. Notably, recent drug testing legislation has incorporated this rationale. A bill introduced in Louisiana in 2009 declares that the state has a "compelling interest in providing
safeguards to eliminate the misappropriation of entitlement benefits." H.R. 137, 35th Reg.
Sess. (La. 2009).
403 Cf Note, supranote 153, at 2001-02.
40 See Gustafson, supra note 74, at 679.
405 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 336-37.
406 Id. at 336; see, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002).
407 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d
at 336.
408 See supra Part II.A.3.
409 See supra note 250 and accompanying
text.
410 See supra notes 244 & 247 and accompanying
text.
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welfare population is precisely the kind of symbolic empty gesture that the Supreme
Court has repudiated as a basis for suspicionless searches in other contexts.
The results of Michigan's brief period of testing corroborate this conclusion. Of
the 258 participants, only twenty-one tested positive for an illicit drug, all but three of
whom for marijuana use alone.4 12 Thus, of the subject population, only 8.1 percent
tested positive for any drug, and only 1.2 percent were identified as using a serious
illicit drug.413 In the recounting of the Sixth Circuit, however, this data reduced to the
following fiction: "[T]he tests so far conducted have resulted in approximately ten
percent positive results, demonstrating that the means utilized by Michigan are effective
in detecting drug abuse among aid recipients.'A1 4
Positing the efficacy of drug testing, the Sixth Circuit turned next to the countervailing privacy interests and predictably concluded that welfare recipients lack a defensible expectation of bodily privacy. 4 15 The court based this conclusion on the novel
assertion that welfare is a heavily regulated "industry"" that carries with it "a correspondingly diminished expectation of privacy."'" In support of the proposition, the
Sixth Circuit cited-but did not quote-a passage from Skinner v. Railway Labor
Executives'Associationthat referenced the scope of industrial regulation in upholding
a drug testing program for certain railroad employees. 4 18 The actual language of the
cited passage, however, demonstrates a quite different and especially unhelpful point:
"[T]he expectations of privacy of [the tested] employees are diminished by reason of
their participation in an industry that is regulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal
dependent, in substantial part, on the health and fitness ofthe covered employees."'"
The diminished expectation of privacy in Skinner, then, was not a function of regulation generally but of the specific employees' state-supervised obligation to protect
public safety-a concern that obviously offers no support for Michigan's blanket drug
testing scheme.
The Sixth Circuit thus advanced a proposition bearing no relation to the holding in
Skinner: that the state's general power to search regulated businesses420 establishes by
analogy an equivalent power to search the blood and urine of "heavily regulated" welfare recipients.421 It is not an elusive distinction, however, that
4"
412
413

Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997).
See supra notes 262-63 and accompanying text.
Id

Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,
judgment vacated,319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
415 Id. at 336-37.
416 Id. at 336.
414

417
418
419

420
421

Id. at 337.
Id. at 336-37.

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989).
See, e.g., Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 337.
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the general acceptance ofrandom inspection programs with respect
to the scrutiny of businesspremises does not support a comparable
approach as to drug testing of [individuals] .... Urinalysis in par-

ticular is more intrusive, as it involves a "basic offense to human
dignity." This means, for one thing, that random drug testing
should be rarely allowed and only upon a showing considerably
more substantial than would suffice to support a random business
inspection scheme.422
Needless to say, the suggestion that a welfare recipient's expectation of bodily privacy
is analogous to the privacy of a meat-packing plant is an improbable stretch. Were it
not, the Sixth Circuit's argument would subject virtually anyone receiving a regulated
government benefit to suspicionless searches within the administrative scope of the
program in question. By unhinging privacy expectations from public safety, as in
Skinner, and linking them instead to the degree of government regulation, the court's
argument would empower the state to unilaterally disable the Fourth Amendmentsince by simply increasing the extent of its regulatory intrusion, government would
simultaneously invalidate any countervailing privacy expectation.423 So construed,
the Fourth Amendment would be reduced to a perfectly circular nullity.424
The circuit completed its analysis by turning to Wyman v. James.425 "Even were
we to conclude that the state could not show a special need sufficient to justify the
drug testing," the court declared, plaintiffs would still lose under Wyman.426 Reliance
on the superseded and idiosyncratic authority of Wyman to trump the special-needs
analysis, however, is impossible as a matter of ordinary adjudication. First, as the
district court noted, Wyman's analysis rests on a variety of assumptions that are irreconcilable with more recent special needs authority, including the proposition that the
voluntary nature of a request for assistance generally diminishes a recipient's expectation of privacy with respect to all related administrative interactions.427 If Wyman's
voluntariness analysis were still good law, the Supreme Court's subsequent specialneeds decisions in the employment context would have been reasoned in an entirely different fashion, since in each the individual's relationship with the state was the product
of a voluntary employment arrangement that would have obviated any further inquiry
c'...+ :0.s
iA~~
A~g,
ucm
the outcome
as the
ditrct+hcourtnoted,
reasoning.42428 Indeed,
underJLthie Sixth Cl%"ircuit's
422

LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 10.2(g) (footnote omitted).

See Stuntz, FourthAmendment Privacy,supra note 74, at 1268.
Id.
425 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
426 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d
at 337.
427 See Marchwinski v. Howard, 113 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1143 (E.D. Mich. 2000), aff'dby
an equally dividedcourt, 60 Fed. Appx. 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); cf Marchwinski, 309
F.3d at 337.
428 See Nat'l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656(1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
423
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itself would have changed in Chandlerv. Miller, since the activity in questionrunning for public office-is voluntary as well.429 Similarly, Wyman's reference to
the state's interest "in ensuring that the money it gives to recipients is used for its
intended purposes" 0 echoes the Sixth Circuit's effort to devise a special need on the
same fiscal-oversight grounds and suffers from the same insurmountable flaws.43'
Thus, to accede to Wyman in the face of the conflicting requirements of the specialneeds doctrine necessarily requires that one accept a poverty-specific Fourth Amendment doctrine which, through Wyman, bypasses the protections afforded all others.
In dismissing special needs in deference to Wyman, this is precisely the conclusion
reached by the Sixth Circuit.
Beyond the fact that the special-needs doctrine supersedes Wyman and forecloses
its reasoning, the Wyman analysis itself provides quite limited support for the privacy
intrusion at issue in the Michigan litigation. In Wyman, caseworkers visited the homes
of welfare recipients for the specific purpose of assessing their needs and the welfare
of dependent children.43 2 The Wyman Court relied heavily on this rehabilitative objective to uphold the contested practice-emphasizing in particular that the entries were
friendly,433 involved no close inspection of the premises,434 and were designed not to
penalize program participants but to aid in their assistance.435 By contrast, drug testing
is punitive, invasive, and has only an attenuated connection to either the needs of recipients or the well-being of their children.436 Ignoring these differences, the Sixth
Circuit declared that the Michigan program was analogous to Wyman because "[t]he
State is attempting to insure that children are adequately cared for" and that "ascertaining whether the adult recipients . . . are abusing controlled substances is directly
"
related to that end. 437
Having thus mischaracterized all material aspects ofthe special-needs inquiry and
its relationship to Wyman, the Sixth Circuit reached the predestined conclusion that
Michigan's drug testing program was constitutionally permissible.4 38 The breadth and
magnitude of the court's analytic errors, and their improbable implications if applied
beyond the context of welfare administration, highlight the fundamentally different type
See Marchwinski, 113 F. Supp. at 1143; Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 338; see Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318-19.
431 See supra notes 401-03 and accompanying text.
432 Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319-20.
433 Id. at 322-23.
434 Id at 320-21 ("snooping in the home [was] forbidden").
435 Id. at 317, 319-20; see, e.g., id.at 319 ("The emphasis ofthe [program] is upon the home,
upon 'close contact' with the beneficiary, upon restoring the aid recipient 'to a condition of selfsupport,' and upon the relief of his distress.").
436 See supra notes 408-13 and accompanying text.
437 Marchwinski v. Howard, 309 F.3d 330, 338 (6th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted,
judgment vacated,319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see LAFAVE, supra note 109, § 10.3
(noting that the Marchwinskicourt "misread Wyman").
438 Marchwinski, 309 F.3d at 338.
429
430
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of adjudication at issue here. To make sense of Marchwinski in light of the conventional Fourth Amendment, one must accept that the analysis operates outside the constraints of normal doctrine-as illustrated by the court's desultory effort to reconcile
its reasoning with otherwise binding authority. The Sixth Circuit's opinion inhabits
a separate and subconstitutional dimension of the law, demarcated by the court's instinctive sense that welfare recipients are simply different when it comes to the question
of privacy. Within that separate sphere, poverty functions as a proxy for cause and the
requirements of individualized suspicion yield to the presumptive culpability of an
imagined class of drug addicts, criminals, and welfare queens.
The fate of Michigan's testing program, however, was still not settled. On plaintiffs' petition for en banc review, the full Sixth Circuit vacated the panel opinion,"'
reheard the matter, and ultimately upheld the district court's injunction by an equally
divided vote announced in a four-sentence order.440 That divided and conclusory resolution, while bringing an end to Michigan's testing program, simply underscored the
broader challenges that face indigent litigants asserting privacy interests. The question
should not have been remotely close: neither the special-needs doctrine nor Wyman
provides any principled basis to inflict suspicionless body searches upon the entire
population of welfare recipients. The full circuit's equivocation in addressing the
question merely deferred the issue to another day and compounded the sense that
few rights come easily to the American poor.
CONCLUSION

The Constitution remains an elusive and often hollow promise for impoverished
Americans. Facing doctrine that formally rejects both positive socioeconomic rights
as well as any meaningful protection against discriminatory state action, the poor as
a class are explicitly deconstitutionalized in relation to the law. Beyond doctrinal indifference, however, the indigent face affirmative bias as well. Across a range of fundamental interests, the judiciary has established a bifurcated system of rights enforcement
that denies indigent litigants the full force of otherwise applicable constitutional guarantees. The construed Constitution is thus not merely irrelevant but at times quite
hostile to the interests of those most in need of its protection.
This Article proposes a modest step forward in the effort to reset this constitutional
relationship: to finally repudiate the longstanding bias that burdens indigent litigants
seeking to vindicate basic privacy rights. In a series of decisions stretching from
Wyman to Marchwinskiand Sanchez, the federal appellate courts have crafted a subconstitutional privacy doctrine that subjects welfare recipients to unique and humiliating
intrusions. The decisions reflect the familiar premise that the poor constitute an inherently culpable class and thus that poverty itself may be used as a proxy for cause in
439
44

Marchwinski v. Howard, 319 F.3d 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
Marchwinski v. Howard, 60 F. App'x 601 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
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justifying suspicionless intrusions. In rejecting this caricature, the district court in
Marchwinskitook the Constitution at its word and applied the Fourth Amendment on
its conventional terms to uphold the poor's basic right to bodily autonomy. The prospect of litigation around the flood of new drug testing proposals may offer the federal
judiciary a chance to revisit its choice between these two starkly different visions of
the privacy right, and to finally remedy an enduring injustice.
The choice should not be difficult. Embracing neutral adjudication in this context,
however, would represent a decisive shift in the judiciary's treatment of impoverished
Americans. The opportunity may soon arrive for the courts to take that small but defining step. It will be an occasion not only to redeem a corrupted doctrine but to affirm
for the poor the legitimating promise of constitutional adjudication itself.

